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Chapter 1

HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA WELFARE POLICIES

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of the history

of California welfare policies and to examine county-funded general re
lief policies across the 58 counties in California and across time.

An extensive search of the literature was conducted through the
University of California library system and national reference libraries.
A history of California welfare policies after 1935. has not been writ

ten.

Only one article presents a history of the 1957 California legis

lature and its welfare reforms.^ The bibliography reflects the available
literature on this subject.

The only available data on all counties' general relief policies
was a 1981 state survey conducted by the California Department of Social
Services.

This survey concerned only maximum benefits available on a

county-by-county basis. Because general relief programs are county—

1. tenBroek, Jacobus, "Welfare in the 1957 Legislature," Califor
nia Law Review 46 (August 1958), pp. 331-375.

funded, very little data is maintained at the state level.^ This author
became interested in the wide variations of county general relief programs

through various discussions with Candy Nobel and Ginger Simpson of the
Statistical Services Branch of the California State Department of Social

Services during December 1982. It was apparent that no one had conducted

an extensive study of general relief programs.

For this reason, the

survey shown in Appendices A and B was conducted at the beginning of this

study (done in December 1982 and January 1983).
Furthermore, it appeared that policies of welfare were cyclical and
that certain variables had some influence on general relief policies.

These variables are presented in Chapters 2 and 3 as well as development
and outcomes of presented hypotheses.

PREMISES OF THE POOR LAWS

Although most of the current debate on welfare dates back to the

New Deal in the 1930's, welfare in the United States is not a recent

development.

The origins of current American welfare policy go back to

the colonial era.

2.

The English Poor Laws of the sixteenth and seventeenth

These programs receive neither state or federal funding.

The

state only required counties to report statistical data concerning "Home
Relief Recipients and Expenditures by Type and Case," "Total General
Relief Expenditures by Type," "General Home Relief Total Persons Aided,"
"Expenditures and Percent Change," and "Miscellaneous General Relief
Cases, Persons and Expenditures," on a monthly basis in Public Welfare
In California PA-3 until July 1982. After that time (the beginning of a
new fiscal year) the reported data was changed. For this reason, this
author is concerned with fiscal years in the cross-sectional study.

centuries influenced the colonial leaders who drew heavily upon them when
formulating the American approach.

Therefore, in order to understand

welfare philosophy in,the, United States, a closer study of the English

Poor Laws is necessary.^
Before the Poor Laws were enacted, economic conditions produced a

rise in poverty in England.

However, many felt it was laziness that

caused poverty and that the poor should be punished because they were

poor.^ Even in the fourteenth century it had been a crime to give alms
to "those which may labor."

After that time period only those who were

"impotent" (disabled) were allowed to beg.^ The distinction between the
"impotent" and the able-bodied poor became the centerpiece for the Poor
Laws and, indeed, for most subsequent welfare legislation.

Local Public Responsibility For The Poor

The Poor Laws* enactment was the first time that local governmental

responsibility for the poor was established.^ Prior to this, churches
and charitable organizations had cared for the poor. The church's poverty

jurisdiction was similar to that for marriage and divorce.^ Also, beg

3.

deSchweintz, Karl, England's Road to Social Security (Phila

delphia, Pennsylvania:

University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943), p. 59.

4.

lb id.

5.

Ibid.

6.

43 Elizabeth 1, chapter 2, (1601).

7. tenBroek, Jacobus, Family Law and the Poor (Westport, Connec
ticut: Greenwood Publishing Company, 1971), p. 12.

ging was an established and reputable practice.

The government respon

sibility assumed by the Poor Laws was not intended to eliminate these

other sources of aid. They were designed to supplement charitable programs

administered by others and to give local government authorities the right
to attend to the poor. However, all of these other sources of aid were to

be funneled through the local governments.

The Deserving and Non-deserving Poor

Because local governments were now responsible for the poor, they

alone decided who should receive aid and who should not. Relief was given

without reservation to the "lame, impotent, old and the blind."®
were the deserving poor.

These

The non-deserving poor were those classified

as vagrants and the able-bodied unemployed.
The vagrant was put to work and the money from his labors was used to

pay the balance of his debt or to support his wife and children.^ Vagrants
who refused to work could be removed to houses of correction, whipped,
branded, stoned, or put to death.

Those considered paupers (the able-

bodied and unemployed poor) were punished by being placed in workhouses.

8.

43 Elizabeth 1, chapter 2, (1601),

9.

Ibid.

10.

(New York:

Trattner, Walter I., From Poor Law to Welfare State 2nd ed.

The Free Press, 1978), p. 8.

OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF THE POOR LAWS

Workhouses

Implicit in the Poor Laws was the condition that the able-bodied

but poverty-stricken person must work for the charity he or she received.

Parish workhouses were set up to this end. The overseers of the poor were
to set to work "all such persons, married or unmarried, having no means
to maintain themselves, and use no ordinary and daily trade of life to
get their living by." At these workhouses the parishes were to raise....

(by taxation)...a convenient stock of flax, hemp, wool, thread, iron and

other necessary ware and stuff, to set the poor to work.^^ The belief of
the English Parliament was that the poor could be reformed by removing
them from the environments which had presumably led them astray.

Residency Requirements

In order to receive aid the pauper had to have established settle

ment in the community.

Strangers were to be forcibly removed if they

were destitute or likely to become so.^^ Economic security was very im
portant then as it is now.^^ This was a time of severe food shortages,

11.

43 Elizabeth 1, chapter 2, (1601).

12.

Ibid.

13.

43 Elizabeth 1, chapter 2, (1601).

14.

Ibid.

15.

deSchweintz, England*s Road, p. 62,

widespread famine, and escalating prices.

The stranger at the door was

perceived to be a threat and there simply was no aid available for him.^^
Responsibility of Relatives

Parents, insofar as their means would allow, were legally liable
for the support of their children and grandchildren.

Likewise, children

were responsible for their needy parents and grandparents.

Those who

could afford to were charged by local officials to discharge their duty
"in that manner and according to the rate fixed.

TENETS OF CALIFORNIA WELFARE

The above tenets of the Poor Laws have been passed down from gen

eration to generation. Though most of these laws (e.g., the death penalty

for vagrancy) have been modified over time, this type of welfare law
exists in California today.

General relief policies across all coun

ties have many of the same characteristics. However, welfare policy under
Spain before statehood was considerably different.

16.

Ibid.

17.

Ibid.

18.

43 Elizabeth 1, chapter 2, (1601).

19. tenBroek, Jacobus, "California's Welfare Law - Origins and
Development," California Law Review 45 (July 1957), p. 270. See also
California Welfare Handbook of 1982 published by the California State
Department of Social Services.

SPANISH WELFARE POLICY^O

In the early days, the Spanish priests established

missions for

the care and instruction of Indians living in California. California was

an outpost on the periphery of the Spanish empire. Theoretically, it was
under the absolute power of Spain. In actuality, California was left to

its own devices and a system of welfare evolved through the missions.
A thin line of missions (21) stretched up the coast of California.

This system of missions maintained maximum control over the Indians,
providing work for them and "civilizing" them. The missions were thus

an integral part of Spanish policy. They were not only religious but mili
tary, political, economic, and social centers.

The Spanish colonial policy held that the Indian should be inte

grated into their society. The objective of this was consistent with the

Catholic conception of the Indian as one who, though barbarous, uncon
verted, and degraded, was yet a person with an immortal soul to be saved.

Once recognized as such, the Indian was therefore accepted.

Another

reason for Spanish acceptance was the lack of sufficient number of Span
iards to settle California. In lieu of Spaniards, the Indians would have
to do.

20. Information presented in this section is based on the research

of Jacobus tenBroek in his article "California Welfare Law - Origins and
Development," California Law Review (July 1957), pp. 241-303.

-
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The mission was intended to be a temporary answer to colonization
of the land.

When the taming of the Indians was completed, the priests

were to move on to other frontiers.

The missions were to become pueblos

and the land divided among the Indians, thus guaranteeing their welfare.

Despite the apparent concern for the Indians' souls, this system
of welfare was very punitive.

The Indians were captured and forced to

learn hygiene and civilized ways.

They were not allowed to leave the

missions and if they escaped they were severely punished when they were
recaptured.

The laws of Mexico (and Spain) continued to influence California
until 1822, long after the secularization of the missions and the begin
ning of the influx of settlers from the United States.

Although, the

welfare system based on communal labor died with the missions in the

1830's, there were many general provisions dealing with welfare subjects.

Often, Spanish (and frequently, pueblo) law gave its blessing and finan

cial support to charitable establishments of both public and private
origin.

These institutions dealt with the problems of dependent and

deliquent children, of the sick, and of vagrancy.

However, the problems

of the aged, disabled or simply poverty-stricken received less attention.

Overjall 5 Mexican (and Spanish) policy showed no consistent pat
tern.

This changed with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1846.

treaty ceded the territory of California to the United States.

The

Welfare

policy began to change significantly with statehood in 1849.

1849 THROUGH 1929

the arrival of settlers from the United States profoundly altered

the demographics of California.

From gold-rush days to the present the

dominant part of the population has consisted of white Europeans. There
fore, Anglo-American tradition of welfare policy soon replaced the poli

cies of Spain.

The welfare provisions now existing in the state come

from the Poor Laws. The restrictiveness of these laws passed to the state

of California. The principles of local governmental responsibility, con
ditions of eligibility, relief for the poor who were unable to work and

reimbursement by a wealthier relation were all adopted.22 As in the Poor

Laws, these restrictions generally excluded the able-bodied poor.23
The state constitution of 1849 and its revision in 1879 both allowed

for the care of the indigent sick but not of the employable poor.2^ in
1852 county boards of supervisors were given the right by the state to
care for various needy persons as they saw fit.

In general, the boards

relied on the state's restrictive classifications. For example, in Placer
county poor persons were separated into socially respectable and unrespec

table, and those who were indigent before or after illness.25

gan Mateo

21. In 1850 "More than twenty-nine thirtieths of the immigrants
in the state came from that part of the union where the common law (English)
was recognized." These men were therefore acquainted with common law.
The majority of California judges knew very little about civil law or the
law of Spain but practiced the common law of England. Jack Goodwin, The

Establishment of State Government In California (Berkeley, California:
University of California Press, 1914), pp. 285-286.
22.

California Welfare Handbook, Op. Cit.

23.

Ibid.

24.

Cal. Stat. 1852, c. XXXVII, p. 87, s. 7.

25.

Placer County, 1852, c. CCXI, p. 243.
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county in 1866 was unique in its policy toward indigents.

They provided

for the care of all the indigent - not only the sick.^^ In the rest of
the state during the IBSOVs, however, welfare for the indigent was at low
levels.

Labor was in constant demand in California.

But with the com

pletion of the Central Pacific Railway in 1869, the demand for laborers
decreased.

Industry and agriculture were unable to absorb all those who

were unemployed and the need for welfare grew.^^
Thus, beginning in 1870, the problem of caring for the unemployed
became a serious

problem for local communities.

Various benevolent

societies began in cities and towns from Grass Valley to San Diego. These
societies aided the unemployed until the adoption of the 1879 constitu

tion prohibited such societies.^® These societies were considered secret
societies and against the new constitution.

During the 1880*s many of the unemployed came to San Francisco to
seek work.

The city was overwhelmed with requests for aid and churches

fed more than 2,000 men daily during the most severe period of unemploy
ment.

Even so, there was considerable discrimination at this time and

only whites were aided.

In fact, many measures were passed which speci

26.

San Mateo County, 1866, c. CCVI, p. 339, s. 15.

27.

Cahn, Frances and Valeska Barry, Welfare Activities of Fed

eral, State and Local Governments in California 1850-1934, (Berkeley,
California: University of California Press, 1936), p. 198.
28.

Constitution of California, 1879, Art. IV, Sec. 22.

29.

Cahn, Welfare Activities, p. 199.
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fically excluded the immigrant Chinese and the native Indian.
Empla3nnent returned to a higher level during the late 1880*s, but

in 1893 a financial panic brought about another depression.

The result

was mass unemployment and a demand for welfare services for the unem

ployed.

Again, the city of San Francisco provided relief for many by

contributing $3,000 per month to various charities and churches who aided

the able-bodied poor.^^ Even the police gave free meals and lodging (in
the jails) to all who applied.
Many were so desperate that they joined roving bands who sought work

in towns across the state.

those in other states.

federal aid.^^

In 1894, these bands of men joined with

They marched to Washington, D.C., demanding

Congress did consider the federal welfare issue but in

the end no aid was made available.

This was considered a local issue and

not a federal concern.

30.
Coolridge, Mary Roberts, Chinese Immigration, (Berkeley,
California: University of California Press, 1909), p. 37.
31.

Cahn, Welfare Activities 1850 - 1934, p. 203.

32.

Ibid.

33.
McMurray, Donald L., Cozey's Army, (Berkeley, California:
University of California Press, 1929), p. 127.
34.

lb id.

35.

Ibid.

36.

Ibid.
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The persistent problems of poverty and unemployment increased the
pressure toward centralized welfare policy. Finally, in 1903, the State
Board of Charities and Corrections was initiated.

This Board assumed

responsibility for all welfare except county general relief. Despite the
centralization, the structure of welfare policy changed little.
gorization of aid was continued by the Board.

Cate

The indigent sick, the

aged, the blind, and the orphaned children were aided but the able-bodied

poor person was still excluded. There were reorganizations of the Board
in 1927 and 1928 as the Board became the Department of Social Welfare.

Still, no plans or provisions were made for the able-bodied unemployed.
THE 193Q'S

During the 1930's welfare philosophy changed. In particular, the
Great Depression had a lasting effect on welfare policy.

First, after

1933 the federal government took an active role in relief for the first
Q

Second, because of the large number of people who were destitute

it was perceived by policymakers that poverty was not necessarily the
fault of the poor.

As a result, some type of relief was made available

to all who were able to prove that they were in need.

Even so, cate

37, Leiby, James, "State Welfare Administration in California,
1879 - 1929," California Historical Review 41 (May 1972), p. 175,
\

38, "California Conference of Social Work," Bulletin (Aug, 1928),
pp, 19-20,

39, Pierson, Harry E,, "The Changing Relief Picture," Tax Digest
19 (December 1941), p, 406.

i
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gorization and other forms of restriction persisted as the welfare rolls
expanded•

The resulting conflict in welfare philosophy between the New

Deal philosophy of giving aid to everyone and the Poor Law philosophy
blaming the poor for their problems profoundly affected welfare policies

during the 1930's.^®
The aid ultimately given to the able-bodied poor was a unique hybrid
of these philosophies.

Aid was given to all who applied, but it was in-

variably in the form of work, not cash. And, there were other restrictions

as well.

The result was the establishment of various work programs such

as the federal Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conserva

tion Corps, and the creation of the work camps by the state of California.

These camps provided a less expensive solution to a potentially explosive
problem.

States.

California had the largest population of homeless in the United

This was due in large part to the migration by many from the

dust bowl region of the midwest. Many of these migrants, married or un

married, went to the work camps where they were sheltered and fed in
return for the work they performed.

Other welfare programs restricted

aid to those who had resided in California for three years prior to their

request for aid, but the work camps were available to all.^^

40.

Ibid.

41. Wood, Sammuel F., "Work Camps Or Nothing," Survey 75 (April,
1939), p. 99.
42.

Ibid.

43.

Ibid*
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Much of the federal legislation was more inclusive and expansionary.

Because there were so many able-bodied people who were out of work and
destitute in the United States, the Social Security laws of 1935 were
enacted.

During the Great Depression there was no help for the workers

who had lost their savings due to bank failures nor any method of aiding
the future retirement of these workers. Social Security and its amendments
to aid the disabled worker and widows of workers as well as their chil

dren provided such aid and greatly reduced welfare rolls.

The first

benefits from federal Social Security were paid in California in 1936.

In conjunction California passed the Old Age Security Act which supple
mented federal benefits.^^
Thus, welfare policy during the 1930's was both restrictive at the
state level and expansionary at the federal level.
impulses persisted into the 1940's.

These contradictory

Fluctuations in economic stability

and changes in political administration effectively created cycles in
welfare policy.

For example, as recovery from the Great Depression be

gan, in the late 1930's and early 1940's, all forms of welfare once again
became more restrictive.

44. Social Security Act of Aug. 14, 1933, for a complete discus
sion see Altmeyer, Arthur J., The Formative Years of Social Security

(Madison, Wisconsin:
45.

The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968).

California Stats. 1936 Ex. Sess., Ch. 7, p. 11.
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1940'S TQ 1960

World War II brought about full employment as the economy gained
strength.

By 1943, the work camps had disappeared.

There were fewer

people in need and the problems of the poor became much less visible.

The federal government assumed ho further financial responsibility for
meeting needs due to unemployment through public assistance programs after

the work camps shut down.^^
The postwar boom continued until 1949 and unemployment remained at
a low level. But, recessions in 1949, 1953/54 and 1957/58 increased un
employment and reawakened images of the previous decade.

In response to economic pressures the 1957 legislature passed 70

measures affecting welfare.

This was 50 percent more than had passed

during the 10 preceding years.

New programs of public medical care and

aid to the permanently disabled were instituted. Programs for the blind
and dependent children were significantly improved.

what the 1957 legislature failed to do.

Of note also is

the two parent household re

mained on general relief funded solely by the counties of California.
Also, during this period, strong national pressures were brought

to provide unemployment insurance of some duration. Instead, on May 1961
the federal government included the unemployed single parent family under

46.

tetiBroek, Jacobus, "Welfare in the 1957 Legislature," Cali

fornia Law Review 46 (August 1958), p. 330.
47.

Ibid, p. 331.
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Aid to Dependent Children (ADC)

However, if there were two parents

in the household only general assistance was available for the family.
The standards for families with two parents set by general relief were

far below the benefits available for one parent households through ADC.

THE 1960'S - WAR ON POVERTY

In the beginning of the 1960's, welfare practices continued in much

the same manner. Counties continued to care for those who did not qualify
for any other type of aid.

However, in 1962 there were some changes in

the makeup of ADC welfare cases. Two parent households were now accepted

(AFDC-U) and thus were removed from the county general relief programs.
Categorization between one parent households (now AFDC) and AFDC-U cases

continues today.

This is important because the change relieved county

welfare burdens.

In 1964, California instituted a "no work, no dole" plan.

This

plan was intended to trim ever-increasing welfare rolls of both counties
and the state welfare programs.

Unfortunately, the plan did not cut

the rolls.

48.
49.

PL. 87-31, Title IV, May 8, 1961.
Simmons, Harold E., Work Relief to Rehabilitation, (Sacra

mento, California:
50.

Ibid.

51.

Ibid.

The Citadel Press, 1969), p. 135.

52. Smith, David C., "California 'No Work, No Dole' Plan Seeks To
Trim Welfare Rolls and Fill Farm Jobs," Wall Street Journal 164 (October

6, 1964), p. 6.
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In 1963 Lyndon B. Johnson became president of the United States.

He subsequently declared war on poverty. California accepted President
Johnson's programs to combat poverty early in 1965.

Under California

Title V programs the state opened day care centers in order to enable the
able-bodied poor to go to work. Work experience and training centers and

centers for the care of the poor were also established.^^ In Los Angeles
county, federally funded housing repair was undertaken and retraining
programs instituted

The Title V programs also concentrated on im

proving the education of the hard-core poor.^^
Though no comprehensive evaluation of the Title V programs was ever

undertaken, overall, the combination of social welfare and training did
improve the plight of many of the poor through 1970.
The impact of the Title V programs on the basic structure of gen

eral relief was profound. During the early 1960's welfare recipients on

general relief in California had risen to 86,000.^6 with the state ac
■t

ceptance of the Great Society programs in 1965, the general relief rolls
fell to 36,000 as many recipients were absorbed into various federal

programs.

As the Great Society programs became more restrictive, gen

53.

Simmons, Work Relief, p. 193.

54.

Ibid.

55.

Ibid.

56.

California, Health and Welfare Agency, Department of Social

Services, Statistical Services Branch, Public Welfare in California, PA3.
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eral relief rolls again climbed.

By 1970 there were 74,000 persons on

general relief.^^
Though the number of people fell and rose again the most dramatic
rise was in grant per recipient.

per year.

In 1961 an average grant was $296.98

The 1965 grant recipients received $401.68 average grant per

recipient per year.^^ Although the number of recipients had fallen the
amount per recipient had risen dramatically as money was shared by fewer
people.

In 1970, the average grant per recipient was $461.88 per year.

The welfare rolls had again swelled but the grant did not decrease accord

ingly.®® As a result, the total cost of general relief grew from $25.6
million in 1961 to $34.1 million in 1970.®^

THE 1970^3

By 1970 California found that welfare costs had risen to a crisis

level.

Approximately 2.3 million Californians were receiving welfare

benefits of all kinds, an almost fourfold increase in ten years. In 1970
alone, the welfare caseload had increased by 20 percent.

57.

About 40,000

Ibid, 1970.

58. All dollar amounts are shown in 1967 dollars.
1961.

59.

Public Welfare, 1965.

60.

Ibid, 1970.

61.

Ibid, 1961 and 1970.

Public Welfare,
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additional recipients were being added monthly.

The increasing costs

were going to have to be met by large increases in state and local taxes
•

•

63

or by the discontinuance of other needed public projects.

Control of welfare restrictions had grown lax in the late 1960's

when many expected President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan, which guar
anteed a minimum income, to be passed by Congress.

Because of this, a

sense of relief resulted in the abandonment of any reform efforts.

It

was thought that the federal government would soon take over all welfare
programs.

In 1971, California found that the federal government did not take
over the welfare /programs and that welfare costs continued to increase.
The state officials under the guidance of then-Governor Ronald Reagan

instituted welfare reforms. They set out to trim from the welfare rolls
those who had no business receiving welfare payments (according to state

criteria for recipients) and to prevent new applicants from joining the
welfare rolls if they were ineligible

A program to educate those who

were eligible for welfare but not aware of it was begun.

62.

Anderson, Martin, Welfare (Stanford, California: ^ Hoover

Institute Press, 1978), p. 154.

63. "Ways to Get Welfare In Hand: Success For Two Big States,"
U.S. News and World Report 75 (December 24, 1974), p. 66.
64. "Governor Reagan's Welfare Reform: Plans, Problems and Pros

pects," California Journal 2 (March, 1971), p. 63.
65.

Anderson, Welfare, p. 155.

66.

lbid.
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There was a move to make existing welfare laws more restrictive and
at the same time to carefully enforce existing laws. According to Martin
Anderson, Welfare the results were dramatic:

"By June 1973 there were 352,000 fewer people receiving public
welfare in California than there were in March 1971.

About

785,000 fewer people were on the welfare roll^than had been
projected on the assumptions of no reforms*

The interpretation of these results is subject to some controversy.
According to Harold Simmons, the Reagan reforms produced a more cost-

oriented welfare philosophy.^®

On the other hand, Barbara Joe recalls

that the state was experiencing a decline in the state rate of growth and

that increased demand for emplojnnent actually was the cause of the welfare

rolls declining.®^
Another work program was instituted by the 1971 reform law.

This

work program required all able-bodied persons on any type of state or
federal welfare to work 20 hours per week.

Most counties instituted work

programs for general relief recipients as well.

This work program was

very successful as many people were trained and subsequently employed,
thus reducing the welfare rolls.

67.

Ibid, p. 156.

68.

Simmons, Harold E., Recycling the 1601 Elizabethan Poor Law

(Sacramento, California:

General Welfare Publications, 1975), p. 87.

69. Joe, Barbara F., "Reagan's Welfare Fraud," Washington Monthly
28 (October 1980), p. 34.

70. Lubin, Joann S., "California Puts People On Welfare To Work In
A Controversial Test," Wall Street Journal 180 (October 20, 1972), p. 1.
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Despite the general restrictiveness of the 1971 reforms, the Poor

Law philosophy contained in general relief policy did change to some
degree during this period. Residency requirements in most counties were

reduced to proof of intent to stay in the county. This could be substan

tiated by a current rent receipt.

The few counties that did not adopt

this policy reduced residency requirements to one year.^^
Another restriction that was dropped from general relief was the

relatives* responsibility clause.

No longer were wealthier relatives

held responsible for general relief costs.

However, these two changes

were small considering other general relief policies discussed below.
Overall, welfare costs were stabilized until 1978 and caseloads

decreased.

But, with the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, property

tax reform meant fewer funds for welfare programs. This was a period of

intense readjustment for California at all levels of government.

It

should be noted that welfare policy became even more restrictive because
of the lack of available funds.

71.

California Welfare and Institutions Code.

72.

Ibid.

73. '*Whither Human Services?*' Western City (March 1979), p. 4.
74.

Ibid.
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THE 1980'S

Welfare policy has continued to be restrictive.

An important

continuing factor in qualifying for welfare is the requirement of a
permanent street address. However, in the 80's many sleep in the street

or in tents.

This is a period of high unemplojnnent and the permanent

address requirement can't be met by those who can't afford rent.

In addition, due to the cut-off of funds for AFDG-U families by the
state and federal governments in January 1983, (because of scarcity of
federal funding) many have been forced back onto the general relief rolls.
Many have also joined the ranks of the unemployed and homeless.

In some

parts of California churches have opened their doors at night in order
that these people have a place to sleep.

With the inauguration of Governor George Deukmejian in January 1983,
once again there is a call for welfare reform.

To date Deukmejian's

principal policy seems to be"work for welfare." This policy has been
instituted before and the objective is to reduce welfare costs.
Currently, 2.2 million Californians receive welfare benefits of all

kinds. The federal government pays $3.2 billion of this cost, the state

75. Raposa, Ron, "Tattered Tent Is Home For Jobless Family," The
Press Enterprise 105 (February 28, 1983), p. B-3.

76. "Homeless Get a Place to Sleep Atop Nob Hill," The New York
Times 132 (January 18, 1983), p. 7.
77. Weller, Don "Deukmejian To Seek Big Welfare Change," The Press
Enterprise 105 (February 26, 1983), p. 1.
78.

Ibid.
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about $2.75 billion, and the counties $330 million, mostly for general
relief.

Like the federal government, the state wants to return more

welfare programs to the local levels of government. Thus, welfare policy

in the 1980's seems increasingly likely to resemble the Elizabethan poor
laws of the 1600's.

CYCLES OF WELFARE ACTIVITY

Until the Great Depression welfare philosophy and policies in the

United States and California were generally restrictive.

A new philo

sophy of welfare for all was born of the overwhelming need caused by the

Depression.®® The alteration between these philosophies begun during the
Great Depression continues to this day.

As World War II created full-employment, welfare policy again became

restrictive.

But when the war ended in 1945 there was a loosening of

welfare polilcy to meet emplo3rment reductions in the post-war economy.®^
From 1950 to 1957 welfare rolls generally, and county general relief

rolls specifically, stabilized and more social programs were added by

79.

Ibid, (all dollars in 1983 amounts).

80. See Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the
Poor (New York: Random House, 1971) and The New Class War (New York:

Random House, 1982) for discussion of the national welfare policies and
how they are used to control the poor.
81.

Ibid.
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the 1957 legislature to aid those who had not been helped by state pro
grams before.

The state continued in an expansionary mode through the Great Society
programs of the 1960*s. However, by 1971 California was met by ever in
creasing welfare costs and another reform again restricted welfare.

The restrictiveness of the 1971 reform was magnified by the 1978
passage of Proposition 13 which again cut state and local revenues. Faced

with budget shortfalls in the 1983/84 fiscal year the state welfare policy
has become even more restrictive in scope. The counties are especially
short of revenue and their policies for general relief remain very res
trictive.®^

GENERAL RELIEF IN CALIFORNIA

In August of 1935 the fiftieth session of the legislature reaf

firmed the laws governing the indigent in California.

General relief

from that day forward was to continue as a county affair to be adminis
tered by county welfare department in conjunction with county boards of

supervisors. These programs were to be funded solely by the counties.®^

82.

See Jacobus tenBroek, "The 1957 Legislature."

83. Counties show evidence of these shortages through their freezes
on hiring and cutbacks in county services.

84.

Hornet, Vaughn Davis, California Social Welfare (Englewood

Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), p. 82.
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General relief is available to any poor person who does not qualify

for other categories of state and federal aid.

These programs can be

considered programs of last resort.

Even so, most counties in California have some standards that must

be met before general relief is given to a recipient. Some of the prin

ciples of the Poor Laws are embodied in these programs. Based on require
ments, even at this level there are deserving and non-deserving poor.
Some of the restrictions placed on general relief applicants include

the necessity of a permanent street address, limits on the amount of cash,
personal property, and equity in an auto or home that an applicant can
QC

have.°° This was substantiated by the survey this author conducted of
all 58 counties in California.

Under California law, counties can establish almshouses and county
Q

farms.®'

State law also permits counties to take action which would

benefit the indigent sick.®8 Counties can also bury the indigent dead;
this is commonly done.®^ Non-residents of a county are to be given emer
gency aid only.

85.

Ibid.

86.

See Appendix B,

87.

California Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 2400.

farm may be established. Section 205.
88.

Section 200.

89.

Section 207.

90.

Section 2501.
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Counties may also require that the able-bodied work for the general relief

they receive.
That the counties may do these various things does not keep them

from doing others or from not doing all of the items stated above.

The

area of county general relief programs is as varied as the 58 counties
in California.

State mandate requires that the counties maintain a pro

gram for the aid of indigents, but the implementations of these programs
are myriad.
For example, Sacramento county has recently instituted the use of

a poorhouse.

Currently, no cash assistance or food stamps are given to

those who apply for and accept general relief.

Instead, since October

1982, people are sent to the Bannon Street house which is run solely for

county general relief recipients.
to sleep.
program.

There they are fed and given a place

They are required to work 3 days per week for this welfare
The effect of this program has been to cut the welfare rolls

and welfare costs dramatically. Sacramento county's welfare program costs

have dropped from $6.7 million per year to $118,000 per year.^^ Actually,

91.

Section 2305.

92.

See Appendices A and B.

93. Taylor, Ronald B., "Needy Denied Cash Aid, Sent to Poorhouse
Instead," Los Angeles Times 102 (February 21, 1983), p. 1.
94.

Ibid.
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general relief applicants are refusing this type of aid in Sacramento
county; instead, they are sleeping on the streets.
Other counties are observing the Sacramento experiment and a re
turn of poorhouses may be seen under the general relief programs.

would again further restrict general relief policies.

95.

Ibid.
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Chapter 2

CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDY OF GENERAL RELIEF

Introduction

In the previous chapter the cyclical nature of welfare policy was
noted. In particular, the evidence suggested that welfare policy at all
levels was profoundly influenced by changes iii $uch external factors as
the state of the economy and the political environment.

The welfare

system responded to these changes by manipulating the only policy vari
ables which were sensitive to direct action by welfare administrators.

These variables were the eligibility requirements, grant per recipient,
and work restrictions necessary for admission to the programs. In other
words, the welfare system responds to economic and political changes in

its policy environment by manipulating just those factors which link
current welfare policy to the Elizabethan Poor Laws.

The use of eligi

bility classification as a tool to manage the growth of the system is as
prevalent now as it was in the 1600Vs.

General relief poliGy is especially sensitive to the influences

discussed above.

As noted in the previous chapter, general relief re

presents the last link in the safety net before the recipient drops

entirely out of the system. This means that recipients who receive gen
eral relief are generally not eligible for federal- and state-funded re
lief.

As eligibility requirements are manipulated at the federal and

state level, the county general relief rolls will fluctuate. As a result,

county-funded general relief policies will reflect not only national
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political and economic trends, but state-level and county-level forces
as well.

The purpose of the next two chapters is to analyze the forces

which influence county commitment to general relief programs.

ferent approaches to this problem are possible.

Two dif

The first approach is

to explain differences across counties in California.

This approach is

important because different counties face different combinations of

economic development, revenue sources, and political context in attempt

ing to establish viable general relief policies. The second approach is
to aggregate county-level general relief data to the state level and look

for state-level factors which influence the aggregate county decisions
across time.

The latter approach will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

In this Chapter the concentration will be on explaining cross-county
differences.

^ The available policy literature suggests that policy decision-

making operates within three sets of constraints.^^ These three sets of
constraints are structural factors, political factors, and policy fac
tors. The most important structural factors are size (population) of the

county, economic conditions of the county (e.g., unemplojnnent rate), and

96. Hawkins, Brett W., Politics and Urban Policies (Indianapolis:

Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 3-18. See also Thomas R. Dye,
"A Model for the Analysis of Policy Outcomes," Policy Analysis in Pol
itical Science, Ira Sharkansky, ed. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co.,
1970), pp. 21-38.
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financial condition of the county (e.g., county government revenue from

all sources).®^ The major political constraint is the political complex
ion of the county (e.g., the Democratic or Republican makeup of the

electorate).^® Size of the county is important because population is a
composite of the influences of such variables as population density,
urbanization, degree of industrialization, and level of economic deve

lopment.9^ In short, size represents the economies of scale associated
with large population. These economies of scale will have a direct impact
on a county's general relief policies.

Urban counties and those with

higher levels of development will have more diversified sources of revenue
and are also more likely to have those classes of individuals who have a

greater probability of being eligible for general relief.

Therefore,

these counties are more likely to have more liberal general relief policies

97. Dye, "A Model for the Analysis of Policy Outcomes."
98.

Ibid.

99.

Ibid.
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and a greater proportion of recipients,^®®
Economic conditions are relevant because the economy of each Cali

fornia county will have a direct bearing on the potential pool of people

eligible for general relief.1®^ The differences across counties in the
size of this pool may well have a direct bearing on the restrictiveness

of each county's policies and the total proportion of the county popula
tion on general relief.

Financial conditions

are significant because

the

size

of

the

available funding will directly influence the restrictiveness of general

relief policy.^®2 Finally, political complexion is important because the

100.

For studies of the impact of urbanization and population on

welfare payments and number of recipients, see Hawkins, Politics and
Urban Policies, p. 70; Dye, Thomas R., Politics, Economics and the Pub

lic: Policy Outcomes in the American States (Chicago: Rand-McNally,
1966), pp. 115-148; Dawson, Richard E. and James A. Robinson, "The Poli
tics of Welfare," in Politics In The American States^ Herbert Jacobs and

Kenneth N. Vines, eds. (Boston:

Little, Brown and Company, 1965), pp.

371-410; Sharkansky, Ira and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State

Politics, Economics, and Public Policy,": American Political Science
Review 63 (September, 1969), pp. 867-879. Of course, not all heavily
populated counties will have liberal relief policies. Such reputedly
conservative counties as San Bernardino County and Orange County may well
have general relief policies more restrictive than expected for their
population. However, the regression techniques which will be described
in more detail below calculate the degree to which a linear relationship
is the best model to describe the relationship between population and
policy restrictiveness.
A highly positive correlation between these
variables would support the hypothesis even though some counties may be
more restrictive than predicted.
101.

Ibid;

102.
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Democratic party and Democratic voters are generally perceived to be more

sympathetic to those on welfare

The policy factors include all policy decisions which are directly
under the control of county welfare administrators•

For general relief

policies these decisions tend to focus on eligibility restrictions.
Specifically, county decision-makers can require recipients to work in a
county work program, can restrict the amount of cash and personal property
the recipient may have and still be eligible, can restrict the eligibility
of recipients with equity in an automobile or home and can manipulate the

size of an individual*s maximum grant.

All of these policy restric

tions will have a dampening affect on outputs from the general relief
system.

The interrelationships among the structural factors can be examined
using a variety of statistical methods.

It is possible to develop these

interrelationships in the form of a series of causal hypotheses.

In

general, the structural factors should influence the political factors.

The structural and political factors should have some causal impact on
the policy factors.

Finally, all three of these factors should have

direct impact on general relief policy outcomes such as county caseload

103.

For example, see, McClosky, Herbert, Paul J. Huffman and

Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and
Followers," American Political Science Review 54 (1960), pp. 406-472.
104.

See work requirements, eligibility restrictions and grant

ceilings for all 58 counties in California in APPENDIX B.

105;

For a more detailed explication of these interrelations, see

the discussion in the sections on the theoretical model and the causal

model of structural

political, and policy factors in this chapter.
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and average amount of the grant.

The data for this analysis are drawn from the period 1974 through

1982.^®^ However, data on the policy factors are only available in 1981
and 1982.

The 1981 data which focuses solely on the size of the maximum

grant per county is drawn from a study by the California Department of

Social Services.^®®

The 1982 data is drawn from a personal survey by

the author of all 58 county Department of Social Services in Califor

nia.^®^

Records of general relief eligibility requirements and work

programs are not documented at the state level.

The 1981 study repre

sents the first such endeeivor of centralized collection of information.

Given the lack of information on policy factors prior to 1981, only

the impact of the structural and political factors on general relief

caseload and average grant can be assessed for the entire period of 1974
through 1982. Despite this limitation, an analysis of the changes in the
relative influence of each of the variables can provide valuable infor

mation about the impact of variations in the structural and political

environment. This analysis will be performed using multiple regression.
The multiple regression technique allows a separate estimate of the in

106.
The expected directions of these interrelationships are
described in more detail in the following sections of this chapter.
107.

See footnote 121 below.

108. Study provided to the author by Raymond Patrick, Staff De
velopment Supervisor, County of Sonoma, Social Services Department.
109.

See APPENDIX A and B.
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fluence of each variable controlling for the effects of all the other
variables in the equation.

The availability of data on the policy factors allows for a more
sophisticated analysis of the 1982 data.

Using the technique of path

analysis, it is possible to analyze the direct and indirect impact of all
the variables in a causal diagram. Multiple regression only assesses the

direct effect of each causal variable on the variable under study. It does
not allow the researcher to assess the interrelationships among the causal

factors. Path analysis provides a mechanism for analyzing such interre

lationships.^^^
The previous discussion is developed in more detail in the rest of

this chapter. The next section presents in discursive form the predicted

relationships among the $tructural factors (population of county, economic
condition of county, and financial condition of county), political factors

(the Democratic or Republican influence in the county), policy factors

(the overall restrictiveness of general relief eligibility requirements),
and the predicted policy outcomes (general relief caseload per county and
average grant per county).

These predictions are drawn from the avail

110. For a more detailed discussion of the multiple regression
technique, see Nie, Norman H., C. Hadlai Hull, Jean G. Jenkins, Karin
Steinbrenner, and Dale H. Bent, Statistical Package for the Social

Sciences, 2nd ed. (New York:

McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975), pp. 320

367. The computer programs used throughout this study are SPSS programs.
111. For a more detailed discussion of path analysis, see Asher,
Herbert B., Causal Modeling, Sage University Paper series on Quantitative
Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-003 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Pub
lications, Inc., 1976).
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able literature on the impact of structural, political, and policy vari

ables on policy outcomes

These predictions are presented as a series

of hypotheses and are summarized in Figure 1.

The section on the impact of structural and political variables
presents the results of the multiple regressions of general relief case
load and average grant per county on county population, county unemploy
ment rate, county revenue per capita and county Democratic voting devia
tion for 1974 to 1982.

The section concludes with a discussion of the

implications of the findings.

The section on the causal model of structural, political, and policy
factors operationalizes the causal model presented in Figure 1.

Some of

the predictions are changed to conform with the indicators used.

revised causal model is presented in Figure 2.

The

Separate path analyses

for general relief caseload and average grant are presented in Figures 3
and 4.

The accuracy of the original model is then examined. The section

concludes with a discussion of the implications of the path analysis
models.

The chapter ends with a summary of the statistical models and an
examination of their consequences.

112.

See footnotes 113 through 123 in the next section for the

available literature.
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THEORETICAL MODEL

Structural and Political Factors

A search of the available literature suggests a number of possible
effects of structural and political factors on each other and on more

explicitly policy-oriented variables.

The structural conditions of a

county ultimately influence both the restrictiveness of general relief
policies and

the outcomes of those policies, such as caseload

expenditures per case.

size of the county.

and

Of these conditions, the most important is the

Size is a composite of many factors such as pop

ulation, population density, urbanization, degree of industrialization,
and level of economic development.

In short, size represents a whole

host of economies of scale associated with the differing economies and
social structures of the various counties.

In general, the more populated the county, the more complex its

economic structure and therefore, the less likely it will be affected by
a poor nationwide economy.

Conversely, smaller counties with simpler

economic structures (i.e. based on a single industry such as the lumber

industry) are likely to be more sensitive to changes in the national
economy.

113.
Hofferbert, Richard 1., "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the
American States:
1890-1960," Midwest Journel of Political Science 12

(August 1968), pp. 401-418; Sharkansky and Hofferbert, "Dimensions of
State Politics, Economics and Public Policy."

114. Dye, "Politics, Economics, and the Public," pp. 7-10.
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The population of the county can also directly affect financial
conditions in county governments.

Larger counties should have a more

diverse source of funds and a larger property tax base.

By contrast,

smaller counties may be expected to have many fewer sources of income.^^^
Size can influence the political context of a county.

Larger

counties, because of their greater complexity, industrialization, and
urbanization, are likely to have more blue-collar workers, more lower

income families and greater ethnic diversity.

These groups tend to be

Democratic and liberal in political orientation.

Rural counties are

inclined to be more homogeneous, less industrialized, and, therefore,

more Republican and conservative.

Population will also directly and indirectly affect the general
relief policies in the counties. The indirect effects of population will
be transmitted through economic conditions, financial conditions, and the
political context.

The direct effects of population on relief policy

will manifest themselves in several ways.

First, counties with larger

minority and low-income populations tend to have less restrictive gen

eral relief policies.

Second, in larger counties a greater proportion

of the population are in need of general relief and there are greater

115. Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions;" Hawkins, "Politics
and Urban Policies," pp. 113-120.
116. Bone, Hugh A. and Austin Ranney, Politics and Voters, 2nd
ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 49-52; See also Nie, Norman H.,
Sidney Verba, John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter, enlarged
edition, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).

38

caseloads.

Third, total expenditures per case are usually higher in

counties that have more of the composite factors of size. This is likely
to be so because the bigger welfare organizations required in larger
counties generate their own policy momentum and

generally increase

benefits as a result.

^

Economic factors, such as the rate of inflation, the unemployment
rate, factory utilization, and interest rates reflect the general eco
nomic well-being of the county. This general economic climate can cause

variation in general relief policy. However, this impact may be contra

dictory in some counties.

Less restrictive policies are likely to lead

to increased caseloads and expenditures.

By contrast, economic differ

ences directly influence the size of the caseload and expenditures per
case for general relief.

It is possible that counties with better

economies have fewer cases and lower expenditures.^^®
At the same time, the revenue and expenditures of county govern

ments can make changes in general relief within the county.

These

financial conditions are influenced and interrelated with population and
economic differences. If the economy is healthy, it is likely that more
tax revenues will be received by the county. Given this situation, it is

117. Dye, "Politics, Economics, and the Public," pp. 115-148;
Tompkins, Gary L., "A Causal Model of State Welfare Expenditures," Journal

of Politics 37 (May 1973), pp. 392-416; Dawson and Robinson, "The Politics
of Welfare."
118.

Ibid.
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highly probable that financial conditions within county government would

be very good and general relief policies could tend to be quite liberal.
Under liberal financial conditions it is possible that general relief
caseload and expenditures per case would expand.

Another factor which influences general relief policy is the poli
tical context of the county.

Policy will vary depending on the conser

vativeness or liberalness of county government. If a county constituency
has elected a strong Republican government, county policies will likely

be Very conservative.

At the opposite end of the scale, if a strong

Democratic county government is elected, general relief policies could
be potentially very liberal.

The political makeup of the county is re

lated to the size of the county and the economic and financial conditions.
By the same measure, caseload and probable expenditures per case for
general relief may change depending on the political makeup of county
government.

Liberal policies may result in larger caseloads and pay

ments, while conservative policies should result iti the opposite.^^®
Policy Factors

Besides structural factors, there are also policy factors which

influence general relief programs. These policy factors directly relate
to the overall restrictiveness of the general relief policies.

119.

Ibid.

120.

Ibid.
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there are three categories of restrictiveness which affect general
relief policies.

1.)

They are:

The monthly amount of the grant given to a general
relief recipient.

2.)

The economic restrictions placed on eligibility
for the grant, such as upper limits on cash,
personal property, automobiles and a home the
recipient may possess and still remain eligible
for general relief.

3.)

The requirement that the recipient must work off

the amount - usually on a county work project.^^1
These policy factors will affect the caseload as fewer people will
receive aid because they do not meet eligibility standards, they are un

willing to work for the money received or the size of the grant is con
sidered too small to live on.

In all these cases restrictive policies

cause caseload to stay the same or tP decrease.

Grant per person, economic restrictions, and emplo)nnent restric
tiveness can have a positive effect on expenditures per case.

If case

load is affected negatively through policy factors, it is possible that
there will be more dollars to be given to fewer people and, thus more
dollars per person.

121.

See APPENDIX A and B

122.

Ibid.

123.

Ibid.
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A Causal Model of County Relief Policy

The discussion above can be summarized by the model in Figure 1.
This figure suggests the following hypotheses.

1.

2.

Counties with higher populations are likely to have:
a.
b.

better economies (+)
more revenue (+)

c.

a more Democratic political culture (+)

d.

less restrictive (more liberal) eligibility and

e.
f•

grant requirements (-)
a larger general relief caseload (+)
more relief expenditures per case (+).

Counties with better economies are likely to have:
a.

3.

more revenue (+)

b.

less restrictive (more liberal) eligibility and

c.
d.

grant requirements (-)
a smaller general relief caseload (-)
more relief expenditures per case (+).

Counties with more revenue are likely to have:
a. less restrictive (more liberal) eligibility and
grant requirements (-)

4.

b.

a larger general relief caseload ('f)

c.

more relief expenditures per case (+).

Counties with more Democratic voting populations are
likely to have:

a.

less restrictive (more liberal) eligibility and

b.

grant requirements (-)
a larger general relief caseload (+)
more relief expenditures per case (+).

c.

5.

Counties with more restrictive eligibility and grant
requirements are likely to have.
a.

a smaller general relief caseload (-)

b.

more relief expenditures per case (+).

Figure 1 about here

Jigure 1
FLOW MODEL OF STRUCTURAL AKD POLICY IMPACTS
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These factors will be further examined and refined in the next two

sections.

The changing impact of the structural variables over a nine

year period (1974 - 1982) will be explored. Attempts will also be made
to produce a causal model of the structural and policy factors which af
fect caseload and expenditure during the year 1982.

IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL AND POLITICAL VARIABLE

The ideal situation would be the development of causal models in

cluding both structural and policy factors (maximum grants, eligibility
requirements, and work restrictions) for the entire period of the study.
However, data on policy factors are available only for 1982. Even so, it

is possible to get some idea of the changing influences of the structural

factors over the research period. This across-years design should allow
a stronger assessment of the independent variables than would be the case

with a single-year cross-sectional study.

124. The data for the analysis below were derived from the follow

ing sources:

Caseload and average grant - State of California, Health

and Welfare Agency, Department of Social Services, Public Welfare in Cali

fornia PA 3, (1973 through 1982); Population - U.S. Census (1980), Pop
ulation Estimates of California Cities and Counties. Department of Fin
ance, Population Research Unit,(1974 through 1979 and 1981, 1982); Revenue
- State of California, Controllers Office, Annual Report of Financial

Transactions Concerning Counties of California, (1974 through 1981),
information for 1982 was supplied by Mike Havey of the Controller's Office,
by telephone; Inflation rate - California Statistical Abstracts. Con

sumer Price Index (1974 through 1982); Vote and Voter Registration - State
of California, Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote for General

Elections and Voter Registration. (1972 through 1982); Unemployment Rate
- State of California Employment Development Department, Employment Data
and Research Department, (1974 through 1982).
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Operationalization of the structural variables can be accomplished
through indicators representihg size, economic conditions / financial con
ditions/and political makeup of the county.

Indicators of the depen

dent variables, caseload and expenditures per case, also can be developed.
The measure of size of counties used was pppulation logged to the

base ten to even out extreme cases.^25

Population was considered the

best indicator because population represents the factors of population
density, urbanization, degree of industrialization and the level of
economic development.

Virtually all previous research studies examining

census data have shown that population is highly related to all these
factors and these sets of variables usually occur together.

In other

words, counties with large population tend to be highly urbanized, heavily

industrialized, and maintain a high level of financial complexity.
The economic conditions are best measured using the unemployment

rate by county by year.

This variabie was considered the best because

it reflects most accurately the changes in the economic well-being of the

county.

But, it is also used because unemployment rate is one of the few

125. Population was logged to the base ten because Los Angeles
County produced a skewed distribution. Use of the raw population data
produced curvilinear relationships with the other variables. Logging a
skewed variable brings extreme cases back in.
126.

For example, see Hofferbert,"Socioeconomic Dimensions."
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measures of economic conditions which is published by county as far back

as 1974.^27

should be noted, however, that the use of unemployment

rates as an indicator reverses the predictions of the causal model since
higher rates indicate worse conditions.
Financial conditions of the counties can be stated as the total

revenue from all sources available to a county.

This was used as the

most direct indicator of the financial condition because this measure is

sensitive to policy changes. Such changes as Proposition 13 in 1978 dra
matically affected most counties' revenue. The overall financial health
of a county is, therefore, directly related to revenue received.

For

this study revenue of the counties was divided by population to obtain

revenue per capita.

Revenue per capita for all years was expressed in

1967 dollars, based on the California Consumer Price Index. Unfortunately,

the result was a skewed distribution dominated by a few outliers. Because
of this, the log to the base ten was used to even the distribution of

revenue over counties.

San Francisco County was only included in 1982.

In earlier years the county did not report its revenue.

The most consistent measure of political makeup over the period of
the study was partisanship. Partisanship was measured by the Democratic

127. For this Study, Imperial County was excluded because of its
abnormally high unemployment rate from 1974 to 1982. Extreme outliers
produce biased regression results by skewing the slope coefficients. Loss
of information is balanced by a more stable estimate for the other 57
counties.

128.

See footnote 125 above.
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voting deviation from the state mean. To minimize idiosyncratic variation
from election to election, an average deviation was created from Democratic
voter registration advantages and Democratic advantages in gubernatorial
and Presidential elections.

Caseload can be defined as single individuals on general home relief
within a county.

In order to remove contamination from population, fig

ures are expressed as cases per 10,000 population. Family cases on general
relief were not considered, as family case data used for this study did,

not give indications of the number of people in each family. Again, be

cause some counties (e.g. San Francisco) had abnormally high case loads,
the log to the base ten was taken to even the distribution.

Expenditures per case were translated as the average grant per month

per single individual. Family cases were excluded for the reasons given
above.

The impact of the structural variables on logged caseload per 10,000
population and average grant per month for any year can be measured by a
regression model:

Logged Cases/10,000 = A +
(Logged Population) + B2 (Logged
Revenue per Capita) + B3 (Democratic
Deviation) + B4 (Unemployment Rate) + E
The least-squares estimates for the equations from 1974 to 1982 are re

produced in Table 1.

129. Example: 1974 Democratic Deviation = i (County Democratic
Vote % for Governor - State Democratic Vote % for Governor) i (County
Democratic Voter Registration % - State Democratic Voter Registration %).
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Table la and lb about here

The R-squared represents the percent of variance in the dependent

variables explained by all the independent variables used in each equation.
The average R-square over the nine year period for logged cases per 10,000
is .48 and the comparable figure for average grants is .47. Essentially,

this means that almost one-half of the variations of both dependent vari
ables over the entire period was accounted for by logged population, log

ged revenue, democratic deviation and the unemployment rate.
The coefficient in a regression equation represents the effect that
a one-unit change in the independent variable will have on the dependent
variable while all other variables are held constant.

For example, in

1974, a one-unit difference between counties in the logged population
produces a .382 unit change in the log of general relief cases per 10,000.

The comparable figure for a unit change in logged revenue is .444 units.
For a one-unit change in the Democratic deviation, the effect is .018

units of change in logged cases.

Finally, a one-unit change in the un

employment rate produces a .017 unit drop in the log of cases.

The in

terpretation for other years is identical.
In similar fashion, for the average grant in 1974, a one-unit dif
ference in the log of population across counties is associated with a

$10.65 higher average general relief grant. A one-unit change in the log
of revenue produces a $25.59 drop in the average grant. And, a variation
of one percent in Democratic deviation is associated with a $.35 fluctua

tion in the average amount received by a recipient.

Lastly, a one-per

TABLE 1

LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR LOGGED CASES AND AVERAGE GRANT
la:
Year

R-Squared

1974

.45

LOGGED CASES

Least Squares Equations

LGCASE74 = -1.983 + .382LOGPOP74 + .444LGREV74 + .018DEMDEV72 - .017UNEMP74
(.097)

1975

.45
.47
.55
.52

.56
.45
.43
.44

(.009)

(.020)

(.385)

(.010)

(.019)

(.377)

(.011)

(.020)

(.358)

(.012)

(.020)

(.428)

(.013)

(.018)

LGCASE81 = -2.986 + .412LOGPOP81 + .808LGREV81 + .024DEMDEV80 - .018UNEMP81
(.112)

1982

(.453)

LGCASE80 = -2.441 + .349LOGPOP80 + .735LGREV80 + .029DEMDEV78 - .026UNEMP80
(.113)

1981

(.016)

LGCASE79 = -3.219 + .364LOGPOP79 +1.088LGREV79 + .033DEMDEV78 - .042UNEMP79
(.095)

1980

(.010)

LGCASE78 = -2.456 + .387LOGPOP78 + .751LGREV78 + .015DEMDEV76 - .054UNEMP78
(.085)

1979

(.432)

LGCASE77 = -1.930 + .415LOGPOP77 + .365LGREV77 + .012DEMDEV76 - .022UNEMP77
(.087)

1978

(.019

LGCASE76 = -1.479 + .395LOGPOP76 + .147LGREV76 + .005DEMDEV74 - .004UNEMP76
(.084)

1977

(.009)

LGCASE75 = -1.775 + .414LOGPOP75 + .226LGREV75 + .010DEMDEV74 + .000UNEMP75
(.092)

1976

(.445)

(.466)

(.012)

(.017)

LGCASE82 = -1.828 + .324LOGPOP82 + .507LGREV82 + .027DEMDEV80 - .015UNEMP82
(.100)
(.323)
(.011)
(.014)

Note: LGCASE equals logged cases per 10,000; LOGPOP equals logged population; LGREV equals logged

^

revenue; DEMDEV equals Democratic deviation; UNEMP equals the unemplo5nnent rate.

°°

TABLE 1 (Contd.)
lb:
Year

R-Squared

1974

.43

AVERAGE GRANT

Least Squares Equations
AVGPAY74 =

58.544 + 10.646LOGPOP74 - 25.590LGREV74 + .345DEMDEV72 - 1.163UNEMP74

( 4.533)
1975

.49

.52

.51

.41

.45

( 4.920)
1980

.45

.55

.44

AVGPAY82 =

.770UNEMP78

(1.008)

9.970LGREV79 + .451DEMDEV78 + 1.224UNEMP79

(18.520)

(.598)

(1.028)

(20.123)

(.624)

(19.349)

(.479)

(16.480)

AVGPAY equals the average grant, see note to Table la for other variable

(.552)

.387UNEMP80

( .862)
.937UNEMP81

( .705)

9.533 + 12.909LOGPOP82 - 10.896LGREV82 +1.529DEMDEV80 -

( 5.121)

Note:

(.531)

.316UNEMP77

( .851)

AVGPAY81 = -31.188 + 18.378LOGPOP81 - 14.115LGREV81 + .773DEMDEV80 +

( 4.679)
1982

(.454)

.832UNEMP76

( .835)

AVGPAY80 = - 8.830 + 14.067LOGPOP80 - 11.690LGREV80 + .869DEMDEV78 +

( 5.328)
1981

(.423)

.199UNEMP75

( .689)

2.110LGREV78 + .313DEMDEV76 -

(18.951)

AVGPAY79 = -34.961 + 16.997LOGPOP79 -

(.433)

1.124LGREV77 - .332DEMDEV76 -

(16.860)

AVGPAY78 = -31.234 + 14.897LOGPOP78 +

( 4.278)
1979

( .869)

4.519LGREV76 - .326DEMDEV74 -

(19.341)

AVGPAY77 = -43.494 + 16.841LOGPOP77 +

( 3.813)
1978

(18.405)

AVGPAY76 = -54.717 + 19.211LOGPOP76 -

( 3.581)
1977

(.441)

AVGPAY75 = -16.123 + 16.618LOGPOP75 - 11.863LGREV75 + .291DEMDEV74 -

( 3.920)
1976

(20.844)

.292UNEMP82

( .669)

names.

vo
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centage point increment in the unemployment rate accounts for a $1,16

fall-off of the average grant.

All other years can be interpreted in

similar fashion.

Unfortunately, while much information is available from Tables la

and lb, the tables do not allow assessment of the relative impact of each
independent variable in comparison to the others. This is so because the

unit of measurement is different for each independent variable. For in

stance, revenue and population variations are expressed in logarithms to
the base ten, Democratic deviation is measured by percentage point devi

ations, and unemployment is measured in percentages.

Moreover, the in

dependent variables do not vary over the same ranges.
In order to assess the relative impact of the independent variables,
it is necessary to express these variables in some standard unit. Fortuna
tely, such a unit of measurement is available.

deviation.

This unit is the standard

The standard deviation is a representation of the average

deviation of each observation from the mean of all observations.

This

statistic makes variables comparable over all units of measurement. Thus,

a standard deviation increase in logged population is proportionately
equal to a standard deviation increment in Democratic deviation.

The

standard deviations for all of the independent variables for all years
are given in Table 2.

Table 2 about here
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Using the standard deviations in Table 2, it is possible to cal
culate the amount of change in both cases per 10,000 and average grants

which will be produced by a standard deviation unit difference in each
of the independent variables, controlling for the others. These results
will be presented in Table 3.

Tables 3a and 3b about here

The units in Table 3a have been translated from logarithms back

into real numbers to improve interpretability.

orders of magnitude.

These numbers represent

For example, in 1974, a one standard deviation

change in the log of population equals an approximate doubling in the
number of cases per capita. By translating the standard deviation of the
log of population into real numbers as well (a .777 standard deviation
equals a 5.98 order of magnitude), the explanation is even more straight
forward: as population sextuples across counties, relief cases per capita

double.

The explanation for Table 3b is less complex:

all figures are

expressed in dollars.

In Table 3a population dominates all other variables in explanatory

power.

The other independent variables do not have great impact until

1978 or 1979.

Those years reflect the impact of Proposition 13 and the

state bailout. Some counties received more revenue per capita than other

counties from the state.

The differences in revenue per county produced

by these events decreased the influence of population.

Overall, the

effects are in the predicted direction, except for the unemployment vari

TABLE 2

STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Year

Log 10 1/
Population

Log 10 y
Revenue

Democratic
Deviation

Unemployment
Rate

1974

.777(3.98)

.132(1.42)

3.492

3.230

1975

.773(5.96)

.139(1.44)

3.118

3.353

1976

.774(3.94)

.136(1.37)

3.118

2.792

1977

.771(3.90)

.133(1.43)

4.477

2.923

1978

.766(3.83)

.163(1.46)

4.477

2.672

1979

.762(3.78)

.163(1.46)

4.439

2.747

1980

.762(3.78)

.167(1.47)

4.439

3.089

1981

.760(3.73)

.160(1.43)

4.918

3.612

1982

.739(3.74)

.188(1.34)

4.918

4.324

1/ The figures in parentheses are the anti-logs of the standard deviations. In substantive terms, they
may be interpreted as orders of magnitude. In other words, in 1974 a .777 change in the log of population
is equivalent to a 598 percent adjustment in population.

TABLE 3

PREDICTED EFFECTS OF STANDARD DEVIATION CHANGES IN THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

3a:

CASES PER 10,000

Logged
Population

Logged

Effect

1974

Year

Democratic
Deviation

UnempIo]rment

Effect

Effect

Effect

1.98

1.17

1.26

(1.13)

1975

2.09

1.09

1.13

1.00

1976

2.02

1.05

1.06

(1.03)

1977

2.09

1.14

1.13

(1.16)

1978

1.98

1.33

1.17

(1.39)

1979

1.89

1.51

1.40

(1.30)

1980

1.84

1.33

1.35

(1.20)

1981

2.06

1.35

1.31

(1.04)

1982

1.76

1.25

1.36

(1.17)

Note:

Revenue

The figures in this table represent orders of magnitude.

Rate

In other words, a one-standard deviation

change in any of the listed variables will produce a change in the dependent variable of the listed magnitude.
The figures in parentheses are reductions by an order of magnitude.
Ln

TABLE 3 (Cont.)
3b:

AVERAGE GRANT

Logged
Population

Logged

E ffect

Effect

1974

$ 8.27

$(3.89)

1975

12.88

(1.89)

(1.49)

.67

1976

14.87

( .61)

(1.67)

2.32

Year

Revenue

Democratic
Deviation
Effect

$ 1.89

Unemployment
Rate

Effect

$(3.76)

1977

12.98

.17

(1.49)

( .92)

1978

11.41

.34

3.66

2.06

1979

12.95

(1.65)

2.01

3.36

1980

10.72

(1.95)

3.87

1.20

1981

13.97

(2.26)

3.80

3.38

1982

9.80

(2.05)

7.52

(1.32)

Note: The figures in this table are in dollars and represent the predicted effects of a standard deviation
change in any of the listed variables. Parentheses indicate a negative effect of standard deviation change
in the listed variables.

4^
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able.

Surprisingly, worse economic conditions apparently decrease the

caseload rather than increase it.

Average grant (Table 3b) is also dominated by population.

Other

independent variables are subject to frequent changes in sign which accent

the conclusions reached concerning population.

Only after 1978 do the

variables show any consistency, and then only Democratic deviation in
1982 displays any effect comparable to population.
Until 1978, size of the county dominates the explanation of dif
ferences across counties for both the number of cases and the amount of

grant. With the impact of Proposition 13 other variables become more im
portant. Proposition 13 clearly made counties more sensitive to fluctua

tions in scarce revenue, economic well-being or the lack thereof, and the

political makeup of the county. But, this sensitivity appears to be more
closely related to caseload rather than the size of the grant.

Counties

seem to reduce caseloads rather than cutting the size of the grants in
response to severe revenue shortages.

Cutting caseloads appears to re

spond more directly to political pressures on the welfare system.
Unfortunately, the structural factors do not present the impact of

more immediate policy factors such as the restrictiveness of county wel
fare policy.

Moreover, regression analysis does not really assess the

interrelationship between the independent variables. In order to disen
tangle all of these effects, a more sensitive technique, path analysis,
will be used in the next section.
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THE CAUSAL MODEL OF STRUCTURAL, POLITICAL^ AND POLICY FACTORS

In order to evaluate the causal model developed earlier in the

chapter, it is necessary to expand on the analysis of the previous section
and translate additional concepts and variables into indicators. To ach

ieve this translation, three major revisions are necessary in the original
hypotheses.

The first revision is the use of the unemployment rates to signify
economic conditions.

Higher unemplojnnent rates actually indicate worse

economic conditions. Therefore, there are changes in sign for those re
lationships involving economic conditions.

The second major change is the specification of the relationships
among unemployment. Democratic deviation, and logged county revenue per

capita which were not specified in the original model.

For this model,

the expectations are that higher unemployment rates will be associated

with higher Democratic deviations because of the Democratic party's tra

ditional concern for the jobless.

The logged county revenue per capita

is expected to have a negative association with Democratic deviation be

cause richer counties are more likely to be conservative.^^®

130. Dye,"Politics, Economics, and the Public," pp. 238-259;
Dawson and Robinson, "The Politics of Welfare," and Tompkins, "A Causal
Model."
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Third, and last, the overall restrictiveness of the general relief

policies should be measured. Maximum grant per person per county is the
indicator that will be used. The other indicators such as property limi
tations and work restrictions showed little influence on either logged

cases per 10,000 or average grant in preliminary studies.

Earlier

predictions suggested that the less restrictive the county the higher the
caseload and the lower the average grant. However, because maximum grant
is being used as a measure of restrictiveness the expectations are that

higher maximum grants will lead to both higher caseloads and higher average
grants.

The revised causal model is presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2 about here

The statistical technique most appropriate for separating the com

plicated relationships diagramed in Figure 2 is path analysis.

Path

analysis achieves this separation by expressing each indicator in the

Figure 2
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system as a linear combination of indicators preceding it in the causal
model.

Thus, each path analysis can be expressed as a series of struc

tural equations.

For example, in Figure 2 there would be five structural

equations. The unemployment rate (Z2) would be predicted by logged popu

lation (Z]^) plus an error term. Logged revenue per capita (Z3) would be
an expression of the combined effects of logged population and the un

emplojrment rate.

Democratic deviation (Z4) would be a linear combina

tion of logged population, unemployment rate and logged revenue per capita.

Maximum grant (Z5) will be predicted by logged population, the unemploy
ment rate, logged revenue per capita, and Democratic deviation.

Logged

cases per 10,000 and average grant (Z5) are formed by the combination of
the other five variables.

The coefficients produced by these structural equations are path
coefficients. These coefficients represent the direct effect of the pre

dictor indicator on the dependent indicator.

What gives path analysis

its true interpretive power, however, is the ability it gives the re
searcher to combine these direct paths in order to assess the indirect
effects of other variables on the relationship under examination.

In

other words, the influence of logged population on logged cases per 10,000
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can be measured directly by examining the path coefficient for that rela
tionship.

In addition, it is possible to measure the indirect effect of

population on caseload by tracing the paths through unemployment rate,
logged county revenue. Democratic deviation, and maximum grant.
The complete path models for logged cases and average grants are

presented in Figures 3 and 4.

The path coefficients in these diagrams

are standardized regression coefficients.

That is to say, they are the

regression coefficients obtained when all indicators are expressed in

standard scores (the Z's in the structural equations in Figures 3 and

4).131

indicators U,V,W,X, and Y are residual terms representing

Figures 3 and 4 about here

131. A standard score is a subject's score on an indicator expressed
as a deviation from the mean of the indicator divided by the standard de
viation of the indicator. Indicators expressed in a standard score form
have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. This gives all in
dicators expressed in standard score form a common unit of measurement.

Figure 3
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the impact of unmeasured variables which have not been included in the
model•

Close examination of both figures reveals that the predicted signs
of some of the paths are not correct. The most significant error is the

path from population to revenue per capita.

The prediction was that

larger counties would have higher revenue per capita.

In fact, larger

counties have significantly lower revenue per capita. This suggests that
revenue does not increase as rapidly as population, and that larger
counties have much less flexibility in their revenue sources.
Similarly, it was hypothesized that higher unemployment rates would

lead to a larger number of cases per 10,000.1^^

The coefficients in

Figures 3 and 4 suggest, on the other hand, that higher unemployment rates
lead to lower cases.

This implies that worsening economic conditions

induce the counties to restrict their caseloads and

the size of their

grants rather than expand them in response to economic conditions.

This

conclusion is reinforced by the negative path from unemployment rate to
maximum grant, i.e. higher unemployment rates lead to more restrictive
policies.

132.

See pages 42 and 58.

133.

See pages 42 and 58 .
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Several paths leading froin revenue per capita were also incorrectly
predicted•

Higher revenue per capita was thought to lead to lower

pro-Democratic voting, but higher maximum grants. The opposite conclu
sions are supported.

Counties with higher revenue per capita tend to

have higher Democratic deviation from the mean, and lower maximum grants.
Larger average grants were also expected to arise from higher revenue per
capita when, in fact, there is virtually no effect.
In general, revenue per capita and unemployment rates produce op

posite effects from those predicted by the model.

Unfortunately, with

many paths it is often difficult to assess the relative influence of
several indicators.

Path analysis does provide a mechanism for getting

around the problems caused by the complexity. It is possible to analyze
zero-order correlation coefficients and break them down into direct ef

fects due to the independent predictor under consideration and indirect
effects mediated through other indicators in the system.

For the models in Figures 3 and 4 the direct and indirect impact
of size on both caseload and average grant can be examined using this

method. More specifically, the correlation between logged population and

logged cases per 10,000 (r=.565) and the correlation between logged

134.

See pages 42 and 58.
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population and average grant (r=.566) can be broken down into direct and

indirect paths.1^5 -j-jjis is done in Table 4.

Table 4 about here

135. The complete expansion is given by the following equations:

1^61 = 1*61 + ^62^21 + P63P3I + P63P32P2I + P64P4I + ^64^42^21 +
P64P43P3I + ^64^43^32^21 + ^65^51 + ^63^52^21 + ^65^53^31 +
P63P53P32P2I + P63P34P4I + P63P34P42P2I + P63P34P43P3I +
P63P34^43P32P21

The term Pgj! represents the direct effect of population on either caseload
or average grant. All terms beginning with P52 represent the indirect
effects of size as channeled through county unemployment rates. The terms

beginning with P53 compose the indirect effects of population as trans
mitted by revenue per capita. The indirect effects of population adjusted
for the Democratic deviation of the county is the sum of all paths beginning
with P64. Finally, the terms containing P55 signify the indirect effects
of population as transferred through maximum grant.
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TABLE 4

DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF LOGGED COUNTY POPULATION
ON LOGGED CASES PER 10,000 AND AVERAGE GRANT

a.

Logged Cases per 10,000
Direct effect:

Logged Population

.461

Indirect effect through:
Unemplojrment Rate
Logged Revenue Per Capita
Democratic Deviation
Maximum Grant

.077
-.137
.060
.101

Total Indirect

.101

Correlation Between Logged Population and
Logged Cases

b.

.565^

Average General Relief Grant
Direct effect:

Logged Population

.270

Indirect effect through:
Unemployment Rate

.019

Logged Revenue Per Capita

.016

Democratic Deviation

.060

Maximum Grant

.199

Total Indirect

.294

Correlation Between Logged Population and
Average Grant

.566*

*Direct and Indirect effects do not sum because of rounding error.
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Several conclusions can be drawn from the table. The direct impact

of logged population is greater on logged cases per 10,000 than on aver
age grant.

Correspondingly, the indirect effects through the other in^

dicators are much larger on average grant.
a little deceptive.

However, this conclusion is

Closer examination of the indirect effects reveals

a remarkable disparity between the two indicators.
Looking first at the impact of population on cases, it is clear
that each of the other indicators has a substantial effect.

Population

as mediated through unemployment rate has a positive influence on the

number of cases.

Democratic deviation and maximum grant also increase

the correlation between logged population and logged cases. On the other

hand, the mediating effect of logged revenue serves to substantially
reduce the correlation.

As a result, the net indirect effect is much

smaller than might be anticipated.

The indirect effects of size on average grant are very different.
Unemplo3rment and logged revenue per capita have virtually no mediating
influence.

The most powerful intermediary effects are those of maximum

grant and Democratic deviation.

In fact, virtually all of the indirect

effects are accounted for by these two indicators.

Substantively, Table 4 suggests

some

interesting

conclusions.

First, the addition of maximum grant to the equations clearly increases
the explanatory power of the models over those specified in the previous
section.

The mediating effects of maximum grant are strong for both

dependent indicators.

This implies that the addition of more immediate

policy factors to a model including structural factors may well improve
the accuracy of prediction.
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Second, the structural factors do not have the same impact for
logged cases and average grant. In the regression equations derived for
the structural indicators in the previous section, the economic and
financial factors had more influence on logged cases per 10,000 than on

average grant. This conclusion is supported by the data in Table 4. The
correlation between logged population and logged cases is distinctly more
sensitive to variations in unemplojrment rate and logged revenue per capita
than is the correlation between logged population and average grant.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has attempted to clarify the forces affecting county
general relief policies in California.

Because general relief programs

are county-funded and county-administered, there is a wide variation in

programs across counties.

Even so, the counties share certain struc

tural constraints and policy restrictions.

A county's relief policies

will be affected by its population, its economic conditions, its finan
cial solvency, and its political biases.

The policies will also be

affected by the number of restrictions placed on eligibility and the size
of the grant.

When these, relationships are tested empirically, certain patterns

emerge. Differences in population clearly dominate differences in relief
outputs.

Within that context, caseloads appear to be more sensitive to

136.

See Appendix B.
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financial and economic differences among counties.

Average grants, on

the other hand, show little sensitivity to economic and financial fac

tors.

Both policy outcomes appear to be sensitive to political differ

ences and differences in policy restrictiveness.

This suggests an in

teresting conclusion. Counties seem to respond to difference in economic

strength and financial well-being by manipulating the size of the case
load rather than the size of the grant.

In other words, the most poli

tically viable alternative for county administrators faced with poorer
economies and revenue shortfalls is the reduction of the general relief
rolls.

This conclusion, however, should be reached with some care.

of this analysis has been based on cross-sectional data.

Much

It is risky to

draw time-based conclusions from such a data set. To evaluate the impact

of long-term fluctuations in structural and policy variables a time-series

analysis is necessary.

Such an analysis, aggregated to the state level,

is presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3

LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF GENERAL RELIEF

Introduction

This chapter focuses on structural, political, and policy factors

which produce changes over time in aggregate county general relief policies
(i.e. county general relief cases and county-funded payments combined
across all 58 counties).

However, because the focus of the study has

shifted from explanation of difference across individual counties to

explanations of state-level differences across years, the theoretical
model must be respecified.
The next section describes the theoretical model in some detail.

The structural, political and policy variables are redefined to take into
account the fact that the data concern changes in aggregate county gen

eral relief policy at the state level, and not differences in policy
across counties.

The indicators used to identify policy changes are total county

general relief cases per 1,000 population for the period 1951 through
1982, general relief payments per capita expressed in 1967 dollars, and
relief payments per case adjusted for inflation.

Data on these measures

are presented in figures 5, 6, and 7. The factors hypothesized to produce

137.

This data is drawn from the 1982 Public Welfare in Califor

nia previously cited.
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variations in these measures across time are economic (unemployment rate),

political (Democratic or Republican control of the state government), and
policy-oriented (major changes in state welfare policy or financial
structure in 1957, 1965, 1971, and 1978).

Population and county re

venue are not relevant since all data is aggregated by counties to the
state level.

The statistical model used to analyze each of the three measures

of relief policy change is time-series regression.

The time-series re

gression model is simply multiple regression applied to cases which re

present time periods. The section on the statistical model describes the
model in more detail for all three of the measures of general relief.

The findings are discussed in some detail.

Then, the possibility that

different policy changes cause welfare administrators to react differ
ently to changes in unemployment rate and party control of the state

government is considered. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion
of the time-series analysis.

138.
section.

These policy changes are given in more detail in the next
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THEORETICAL MODEL

The conceptual model presented in Chapter 2 provides a convenient
starting point for analyzing cross-time changes.

In general, aggregate

relief policies would be expected to respond to such structural factors
as the economic condition and political makeup of the state.

By con

trast, since changes across time are little influenced by factors which

explain differences across counties, size and financial conditions will
have little impact.

Both variables, and their respective indicators,

population and county revenue from all sources, are subject to incremental
growth when examined over any period of time.

This incremental growth,

which is highly correlated with time, is difficult to interpret in a time-"
series context.

General relief policies should also be expected to respond to more

direct policy factors. Such policy factors would include any major changes
in the general welfare structure of the state.

Policy changes by the

state will profoundly affect eligibility requirements and maximum grants
at the county level.

To develop these relationships and to lay the groundwork for the

empirical analysis, the variables must be operationalized. For this study

the impact of the independent variables will be examined on three differ
ent indicators of changes in relief policy. The first will be cases per

1,000 population. The adjustment for population is made to minimize the
influence of population increases in California.
1951 to 1982 are shown in Figure 5.

Data for the period

The second indicator is general

relief payments per capita expressed in 1967 dollars. The indicator re
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moves the effects of both inflation and population increases.

Relief

payments per capita for the period 1951 to 1982 are presented in Figure

6.

The third, and perhaps most important, indicator is relief payments

per case adjusted for inflation.

This indicator should be sensitive to

changes in welfare philosophy at the county level.

This is to say, by

comparing the impact of the independent variables on cases per 1,000 and
relief pa3nnents per case, aii assessment of the relative priorities of the

county relief system ought to be possible. Relief payments per case are
sunnnarized in Figure 7.

Figures 5y 6, and 7 about here

If economic condition is measured using the yearly California unem

plojnnent rate over the period of the study, then the following relation

ships should hold.

As unemployment increases (i.e. as the economy wor

sens), the number of cases per 1,000 should increase.

Similarly, unem

ployment increases should lead to increases in both relief pa)rments per

capita and relief payments per case as demands oh the relief system in
crease.

Democratic control of the state government will produce higher

caseloads and higher relief pa)rments (whether measured against population

or cases).

Mixed control should produce lower overall averages on all

three indicators.

Republican control would be expected to result in the

lowest figures of the three types of control.

Figure 5
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Four major welfare policy changes in California are likely to show
the greatest impact of all available policy factors.

The first is the

package of reforms passed by the 1957 legislature. These laws increased
the number of welfare programs and expanded grant structures. Though not

directly affected by the state laws, the counties liberalized general
relief policies. Therefore, one would expect to find increases in county

caseload and relief payments beginning in 1958.
The second major policy change was the passage by the federal govern

ment of the various War on Poverty programs. The adoption of these pro
grams by California in 1965 changed the welfare structure in the state.
Two changes in particular seem relevant to county relief policies. First,
the wide variety of federal programs allowed the temporary transfer of
many general relief recipients to state and federal programs.

Second,

and more importantly, the Great Society produced a more liberal welfare
philosophy than in the past.

Thus, it became much easier in the long run

to receive welfare at all levels.

In statistical terms, the adoption of

these changes should be reflected in an immediate drop in general relief
caseload followed by a rapid increase. Relief payments for those remain
ing on general relief should increase dramatically since relief funds
would already be allocated.

The third policy alteration impacting on county general relief pro
grams was the 1971 Welfare Reform Act.

In response to rapidly expand

ing caseloads and expenditures at both the state and county levels,
Governor Ronald Reagan proposed, and the California legislature approved,
major changes in the state welfare laws.

The primary focus of these

reforms was the reduction of the caseloads of state-mandated programs.

■

■ ■
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The grants were to remain the same or increase.

Because state programs

are administered by the counties, these changes were carried oVer to

county general relief programs as well.

Therefore, an examination of

general relief cases and relief payments after 1971 should show a dra

matic drop in cases per 1,000 and either no drop or an increase in re
lief payments per case.

The final modification in state policy which had a significant

effect on county relief policy was the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978.
Since most counties rely heavily on the property tax for revenue, the

passage of the proposition effectively reduced available funds for county
programs.

While the state provided temporary bailout money to most coun

ties, the counties responded in the long run by drastically restricting
their general relief programs.

Thus, relief cases and relief payments

after 1979 should show some decrease.

STATISTICAL MODEL

The statistical technique which will be used to assess the rela

tionships discussed in the previous section is again multiple regression.

Unlike the structural regressions presented in Chapter 2, the cases will

represent the years 1951 through 1982.
on 32 cases.

Thus, the analysis will be based

There is, however, an additional complication which arises

from the use of multiple regression techniques on time-series data. This
problem is autocorrelation. The regression model assumes that the forces

influencing one observation are not the same forces influencing a subse
quent observation (i.e. the error in predicting the first observation is
not related to the error in predicting the second observation).

Since
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the cases in a time-series are time periods, forces affecting one time
period are very likely to influence the subsequent time periods, thus

violating the regression model.

In order to deal with the possibility

of autocorrelation an additional statistic, the Durbin-Watson statistic,
which tests for autocorrelation, will be presented.

The indicators to be used in this analysis are presented below:

Yi = General relief cases per 1,000 population.

Y2 = General relief payments per capita (real dollars),
Y3 = General relief payments per case (real dollars).
= State Unemplo3nnent rate by year.

Dj
D2
Ej
E2
E3
E4

=
=
=
=
=
=

Democratic control of state government.
Mixed control of state government.
Passage of 1957 welfare reforms.
Adoption of 1965 Great Society programs.
Passage of 1971 welfare reforms.
Passage of Proposition 13 in 1978.

The Y indicators are the dependent variables in the regression

analysis.

X, D, and E, are the independent indicators.

The unemploy

ment rate (Xj) is a continuous indicator. By contrast, D and E are sets
of dummy indicators. Each indicator is coded "1" for the presence of and
"0" for the absence of the influence.

Note that for both sets of indica

tors there is one less indicator than there are categories.

In parti

cular, there is no indicator for Republican control and no indicator for

the period prior to the 1957 welfare reforms. This is necessary for the
regression model to work. The presence of Republican control is indicated
by the absence of both Democratic and mixed control.

The same is true

for the seven years prior to 1958. The inclusion of indicators for these

categories would be statistically redundant.

«0

The results of the regressions of the three indicators Yj, Y2, and
Y3 on the set of independent indicators are presented in the equations
below:

Yi = 3.226 + .257X - .930Di - .32202 + .705Ei - I.64OE2
(.086) (.327)

(.355)

(.413)

(.390)

-2.202E3 - 2.9IOE4; r2 = .889; d = 1.371.
(.538)

(.537)

Y2 = 1.075 + .139Xi - .35801 " .04802 - .143Ei - •528E2
(.040)

(.152)

(.165)

(.192)

(.181)

- .246E3 - .8IOE4; r2 = .722; d = 1.251.
(.250)

(.250)

Y3 = 363.470 + 5.342X1 + 10.889O1 + 5.82102 - 93.558Ei
(5.889)

(22.361) (24.230)

(24.231)

+ 51.426E2 + 296.714E3 + 303.6I6E4; r2 = .972; d = 1.851
(26.640)

The Y

(36.772)

(36.698)

in each equation represents the predicted Y from the regression

equation rather than the observed Y.

The r2 is the coefficient of de

termination and represents the percentage of the variation in each de

pendent indicator explained by all of the independent indicators. The d

value is the Ourbin-Watson statistic.

In order to conclusively state

that there is autocorrelation the d must be less than .98 for this num

ber of independent indicators. In order to conclusively state that there

is no autocorrelation the d must be larger than 2.01. Unfortunately, all
three values fall in the inconclusive range.

However, it can be shown

algebraically that positive autocorrelation, (the most frequent kind)
biases the standard errors (the figures in parenthesis) rather than the

slope coefficients. This means that the standard errors will generally
be too small and the researcher can oyer-estimate the significance of
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the relationship.

The slope coefficients, on the other hand, can be used

as calculated, but with extreme care.

Recalling that the slope coefficients can be interpreted as the

amount of change in the dependent indicator produced by a one-unit change
in the independent indicator controlling for the other indicators in the
equations, the equations can now be discussed.

Looking first at the re

gression equation for cases per 1,000, a number of interesting facts are
apparent. Controlling for the impact of the political and policy factors,

the relationship between increases in unemployment rate and relief cases
per 1,000 is positive as predicted.

A one-percentage point increase in

the rate of unemployment produces a .257 increase in the number of relief

cases per 1,000 or about one-quarter of one case.

Since unemployment

ranged over a six-percentage point span, the number of relief cases per
1,000 varied by as much as one and one-half cases, almost one-third of
the total range in the dependent indicator.

The impact of the political factors is much more surprising, however.

Democratic control of the state government was expected to lead to in
creases in caseload.

In fact, the opposite is apparently the case.

The

average number of relief cases per 1,000 during Democratic administra

tions is .930 cases lower than under Republican administrations, even ad
justing for differences in unemployment arid policy environment.

Mixed

control produces a higher average than Democratic control, but even this

average is .322 cases below the Republican average.

The strongest influences appear to rise from the policy factors.
In general, the coefficients adhere to expectations.

Adjusting for the

effects of unemployment and political administration, the 1957 welfare
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reforms produce a .705 case increase over the average number of relief
cases during the 1951 to 1957 period. The subsequent policy changes pro

duce substantial drops in relief cases per 1,000 over the 1951 - 1957

period.

Moreover, each policy change represents a substantial drop in

caseload over the previous policy change.

The War on Poverty changes

reduce the average general relief caseload per 1,000 by over 2.3 cases

(from .705 cases higher than 1951 - 1957 to 1.640 cases lower than 1951
-1957).

The 1971 welfare reforms dropped the caseload an additional

.562 cases to 2.202 cases below the 1951 - 1957 average.

Finally, Pro

position 13 reduces caseload still further to 2.910 below the 1951 - 1957
average.

The impact of the economic, political, and policy factors on total
relief payments per capita is very similar.

The effect of unemplo3nnent

rate is again positive, producing a $.139 increase in total relief per
capita for every one-percentage point increase in unemployment rate. The
influence of Democratic control of state government is again negative,

reducing average relief payments by $.358 over Republican control.

In

terms of the policy factors, the highest average relief payments per

capita occur in the 1951 - 1957 period prior to any major policy change.
All subsequent policy changes produced lower average payments per capita.

Only the coefficients for 1971 represent an increase over the previous
time period, and, even then the figure is still below the 1951 - 1957
average.

Relief payments per capita can be viewed as total available relief
revenue adjusted for population.
tively fixed source of relief.

In this sense, it represents a rela

On the other hand, relief payments per
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case represent that total available relief divided among the eligible
cases.

Therefore, dramatically different effects of the independent

indicators on relief per case are not surprising.

unemployment rate is positive.

The influence of

It increases relief per case by $5,342

for every one-percentage point increase in unemplo3^ent. However, since
these payments vary from approximately $296.00 per year to approximately

$764.00 per year, the effect of unemployment is not very significant.
The political influences are equally weak.

A Democratic administration

and a Democratic legislature only increase relief per case by $10,889
over a Republican controlled government.

Mixed control only increases

relief per case by $5,821 over Republican control.
influences are those of the policy factors.

The really powerful

Contrary to earlier expec

tations, the 1957 welfare reforms dramatically reduce relief payments per

case (by $93,558 over the 1951 - 1957 period). By contrast, the 1965 and
1971 policy changes increase relief per case as expected. Surprisingly,

the average relief payment per case after Proposition 13 is slightly

higher (by about $7.00) than the same pajrment in the 1972 - 1978 period.
Before these results are summarized, however, a note of caution is

in order.

None of the regression equations account for possible inter

action among the economic, political, and policy factors.

That is, it

is entirely possible that unemployment rate will affect each measure of
general relief differently for each political change or each policy change.
Normally, this possibility can be assessed by adding interaction terms
representing all possible combinations of the indicators to each regres

sion equation.

But, because the R^ in each equation is so high, the

addition of interaction terms causes distorted results.

Therefore, the
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regression equations for the time periods between each policy change must
be examined separately.

The results for each dependent indicator are

presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7.

Because party control is different

within each time period, the indicators used in each will vary.

Tables, 5, 6, and 7 about here

The segmented regression equations reveal patterns which are ob-^

scared in the more general equations.

In particular, the influences of

unemployment rate and party control on relief cases per 1,000 (Table 5)

and relief payments per capita (Table 6) appear to be strongest in the
periods following the adoption of the Great Society programs and the 1971
welfare reforms.

In addition, unemployment rate, considered by itself,

seems to put more upward pressure on relief caseload than on total relief

payments.

The impact of Democratic control remains negative regardless

of time period.

Table 7 reveals even stronger differences. In the general equation

describing relief payments per case, the coefficient for unemployment
rate is positive.

When this equation is broken down into time periods,

the relationship is negative in all periods but the period from 1965 to
1971. That is to say, for most of the period from 1951 to 1982, increases

in unemployment rate lead to reductions in relief payments per case. The
impact of party control is basically insignificant except during the

period 1972 to 1978 where the average payment increases by $89.46 in the

transition from Governor Ronald Reagan (R) to Governor Edmund G. Brown,
Jr. (D).
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Table 5

REGRESSION OF RELIEF CASES PER 1,000 ON UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
AND PARTY CONTROL, CONTROLLING FOR TIME PERIOD*

1951 - 1957
f

Yl

=

1.499

(.549)'

. 1958 - 1964
f.

pi =

3.734

(.373)

(.633)'

|i ■

1965 •- 1971
i

'!

pi =

.755 +

(.103)

i 1972 -li

(.333)

(.296)'

1978

1

pi =

1.144 •

(.086)

Iil979 --

(.181)'

1982

|Yi = 1.432 - .015X1;

= -013

(.090)

*The period from 1951 - 1957 was a period of solely Republican control.
The period from 1958 - 1964 was a period during which control shifted
from Republicans to Democrats. The segment, 1965 - 1971, showed all three
patterns of party control (including mixed). The time period, 1972 - 1978,
was a period of mixed and Democratic control. Finally, the period 1979
- 1982 was dominated by Democrats.
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Table 6

REGRESSION OF RELIEF PAYMENTS PER CAPITA ON UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
AND PARTY CONTROL, CONTROLLING FOR TIME PERIOD*

1951 - 1957

Y2 =1.101 + .132Xi; r2 = .083
(.196)

1958 - 1964

Y2 * 1.674 - .009X2 " -19502;
(.113)

= -214

(.191)

1965 - 1971

Y2 = -.221 + .278X2 - .50402 - .16502; r2= .940
(.056)

(.182)

(.163)

1972 - 1978

Y2 = 1.086 + .091X2 - .I8ID2; r2 = .501
(.049)

(.103)

1979 - 1982

Y2 = 1.157 - .028X2;

= .103

(.058)

♦The period from 1951 - 1957 was a period of solely Republican control.
The period from 1958 - 1964 was a period during which control shifted

from Republicans to Democrats. The segment, 1965 - 1971, showed all three
patterns of party control ( including mixed). The time period, 1972 - 1978,
was a period of mixed and Democratic control. Finally, the period 1979
- 1982 was dominated by Democrats.
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Table 7

REGRESSION OF RELIEF PAYMENTS PER CASE ON UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
AND PARTY CONTROL, CONTROLLING FOR TIME PERIOD*

1951 - 1957

Y3 =505.113 - 28.848Xi; r2 » .591
(10.727)

1958 - 1964

Y3 = 416.521 - 16.333X1 " 9.5llDi; r2 = .629
(6.375) (10.667)

1965 - 1971

Y3 = 313.534 + 20.929Xi -8.75801 + :30.978D2; R^ = .796
(9.195) (29.816)

(26.502)

1972-1978

Y3 =845.552 - 22.978X1 + 89.464Di; r2 = .940
(5.436)

(11.398)

1979 - 1982

Y3 = 815.806 - 12.974X1; r2 = .685
(6.217)

*The period from 1951 - 1957 was a period of solely Republican control.
The period from 1958 - 1964 was a period during which control shifted
from Republicans to Democrats. The segment, 1965 - 1971, showed all three
patterns of party control(including mixed). The time period, 1972 - 1978,

was a period of mixed and Democratic control. Finally, the period 1979
— 1982 was dominated by Democrats.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The statistical models discussed in the previous section reveal
several things about how counties in the aggregate respond to state-level

changes in economic conditionj political makeup, and policy environment.
First, the regression equations suggest that, overall, California coun

ties tend to view relief policy as a zero-sum game.

Total relief rev

enue combined across counties appears to be relatively insensitive to all

but major policy changes. Caseload, on the other hand, responds not only
to policy factors but to economic and political factors as well. In com

bination, these influences produce the following results: if changes in
the unemplo}rment rate or control of state government force the relief

caseload to rise, the average amount of money that the county gives to

each recipient drops. Conversely, if political and economic changes force
the caseload downward, relief payments per case rise. In general, this
oscillating effect implies two things.

It suggests that counties view

total general relief as a fixed entity. It also indicates that counties

tend to react to external factors such as changes in unemplojrment rate,

political control, and state welfare law rather than act independently.
The only exception to this pattern is the period from 1965 to 1971.

The adoption of the War on Poverty program, while it temporarily reduced

relief caseloads, unleashed expansionary pressures in the relief system.
Only during this period did caseload, total relief payments, and relief
per case increase simultaneously.

This signifies a major, albeit tem

porary, change in welfare philosophy.

The coincident increase of all

relief measures indicates that the fixed approach to relief policy was
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briefly abandoned. However, the consequent rise in both state and county
welfare expenditures produced a rapid political backlash. The 1971 Wel
fare Reform Act was the result.

The final point which can be derived from the equations is the over
whelming influence of state-level policy changes on county-level deci

sions. When the policy changes are controlled for by dividing the regres
sions into time periods, the remaining indicators rarely account for as

much of the variance as the general equations do. Clearly, county wel
fare administrators and county boards of supervisors are highly sensi

tive to policy changes at the state level.

Even when the changes have

bearing only on state programs administered by the county, counties gen
erally bring their own programs into conformity with state programs. This
produces an interesting paradox.

While county general relief programs

vary widely in their eligibility, economic and work requirements, the net
result of changes in those policies over time appears to bring them more

into conformity with external state conditions.

In other words, they

maintain their uniqueness with regard to other counties but react quickly
to changes in overall state-wide conditions.
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Chapiter 4

CONCLUSION:

RETURN TO THE POOR LAW

Counties have accepted the responsibility for caring for the des
titute.

However, their programs vary widely.

While some counties feel

that their responsibility ends with minimal help to the recipient, others

open their treasuries enough to feed and house the poor.

Yet, even the

most liberal counties (San Francisco and Santa Barbara) provide aid which
leaves recipients below the poverty level.

Moreover, all counties are

basically restrictive.

Counties still place the poor in categories. There are "deserving"

and "non-deserving" poor. By most standards, only the "able-bodied" are
eligible for relief. Transients, hobos, alcoholics, and, as a Sacramento

judge put it, the "unwashed" are unworthy of aid.^^^ Those without street
addresses are unable to receive help in most counties.

A welfare offi

cial who shall remain anonymous, stated to this author that no one slept

in the streets in her county despite abundant evidence to the contrary.
Categorization has been perpetuated and becomes more apparent in times
of high unemplojrment.

Furthermore, county residency requirements are perpetuated.

For

most counties these requirements are limited to proof of intent to remain

in the county.

139.
p. 2.

However, some counties have stricter residency require

"The State," Los Angeles Times 102 (April 4, 1983), Part 1,
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ments. The Poor Laws stated that the vagrant, or the stranger who was a

potential vagrant, should be put out of the town without being helped.
This type of thinking continues unchanged in some of the county general
relief policies even if the cities in California are not walled.

If one

must have a residence in order to get aid but have no funds to rent a

room, then the needy person is caught in an endless, downward spiral.
Because county resources are scarce it is also possible that coun

ties will again try to find relatives who are able to support their poorer
relations and reimburse the counties for aid expenditures. The Governor
of California is already suggesting this approach for state medical aid
reimbursement.

Virtually all counties impose work requirements of some kind. Some

counties require recipients to work directly for their aid. Other juris

dictions expect grantees to register with the California State Employ
ment Development Department and conduct an active job search. Still other

counties do not have their own work programs, but coordinate work pro
grams with other institutions. Regardless of the type of program, how
ever, it is clear that most counties believe the aid must be earned.

The most extreme return to restrictive principles is the re

establishment of the poorhouse in Sacramento County. During the incep
tion of the Poor Laws and even into the 18th century in the United States,
poorhouses were used to help the poor correct problems which were con

sidered of their own making. This new poorhouse seems to return to the

thinking that the poor are responsible for their Own problems. On the

15th of April, 1983, the first in what promises to be a long series of
legal decisions on the Sacramento County poorhouse will be handed down.
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This is the day that the judge of the Superior Court of the State of
California is to rule on the constitutionality of the poorhouse.

If the

poorhouse is deemed legal, it is possible that other counties will in
stitute poorhouses to contain the very poorest of the able-bodied.

Actually, county general relief policy has changed little since the
1850's.

With statehood and the settling of California by the white

Europeans, the modified poor laws were instituted. The argument that the

philosophies of that time continue today is supported by history.

Fur

' I

thermore, this study of general relief provides evidence of the use of
the Poor Law philosophy on current-day county general relief programs.

In general, relief policy is restrictive.

It is designed inten

tionally to exclude certain classifications of individuals. However, the

counties also appear to respond to changes in economic, financial, and
political context.

When resources appear scarce, the programs for the

poor are restricted. When these resources are perceived to be plentiful,
the programs are liberalized.
The cross-sectional study completed in Chapter 2 suggests that there

are differences in the way in which county general relief programs across

' , ,

■

'

- '

■' ■

■

the 58 counties respond to external changes. For example, these programs

are sensitive to the size of the county.

restrictive its program will be.

The larger the county the less

The smaller the county, the more res

trictive the general relief program.

That is to say, the maximum grant

in larger counties would be more than the maximum grant available in coun
ties with a smaller population.
Economic and financial restrictions tend to affect the size of the

caseload rather than the amount of the grant.

As these conditions tend

/
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to be cyclical in nature, caseload is allowed to grow during the 'good*

times and is contracted during the 'bad' times. Although this is under
standable from a county government point of view, it seems that more

people need general relief and are unable to qualify for it during the
'bad' times•

Counties that are less restrictive in their policy requirements

(such as those for eligibility) have larger caseloads and higher grants
than other counties.
lation.

These are also the counties with a greater popu

The large counties, by virtue of their size, have a greater

demand placed on them for help by those needing general relief.

The evidence presented in the longitudinal study (Chapter 3) sug
gests that general relief is a zero-sum game. Major policy changes that

increase the size of grants reduce caseload or vice versa. Only during
the Great Society era (programs accepted by California in 1965) did both

the caseload and grants increase for a short time. There was a feeling

throughout the nation during this time that there was plenty for everybody
and that resources were unlimited.

By 1971, California state realized

that its welfare programs cost more than available funds allowed for.

The backlash produced restrictions which were placed on recipients of

welfare.

This reduced the caseloads.

However, grants remained large

and, in some instances, actually increased.
In summary, both studies suggest that counties in California re
spond to policy changes at the state level.

Economic conditions do not

trickle down but are rather abruptly perceived in county general relief
programs.

At the same time, rises in the unemplojnnent rate makes coun

ties more aware of their available revenue. They realize that the rise
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in unemployment rates means fewer dollars in the county treasury. There

fore, the county will restrict general relief programs and will make a

greater distinction between the "deserving" and the "non-deserving" poor.
This alone will restrict county caseload.
As long as restrictive philosophy is the dominant thinking in the

counties, categorization, residency requirements, poorhouse use, and pos
sible relative responsibility will remain in force.

In the author's

opinion, the use of this philosophy does not aid the poor in becoming
upstanding citizens in their communities but will tend to push people

down into poverty.

Although such revolutionary thinking probably will

not replace current welfare law, it would seem that all of the so-called
poor deserve real help, even the homeless.
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APPENDIX A

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The telephone survey of all 58 counties in California was conduc

ted during December 1982 and January 1983.

Welfare departments were

contacted and the following questions were asked concerning their gen
eral relief programs.

The length of the average interview was seven

minutes.

1. Considering a one person household, what is the
maximum grant available?

2. Are grants paid by check, cash or voucher system?
3. What are your residency requirements?

4. Does your county have a work program for the ablebodied? Please explain - for instance, is a job
search conducted and are grants to be worked off

before they are given to a recipient?

5. What are the upper limits on liquid assets, personal
property, real property and automobiles that can be

retained by an applicant for general relief and still
qualify for aid?

6. Do you consider general relief to be an outright gift
or a loan in your county?

Do you take a lien on real

property?

It should be noted that telephone surveys were conducted in 36 of the

counties. Only Nevada and Trinity counties required letters which they
subsequently answered.^

1. See Appendix C for a further discussion of Trinity county.
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APPENDIX B

THE RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The results of the telephone survey were varied and interesting.
The various headings I have used need some further clarification.

One Person - Maximum grant available for one able-bodied person
living alone. Grant amounts are for one month periods.
Personal Property - In some counties personal property and
liquid assets were defined as the same thing.
Other differences across counties are explained in the notes at
the end of this appendix.

It should be noted that most counties had some type of transient
program which 1 have not attempted to explain.

GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE

QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA
LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION

COUNTY

ONE

TYPE

PAID BY

REQUIREMENT

PERSON

Alameda

$200.00

RESIDENCY

Grant

Cash

Intent to

WORK

CASH

PERS.

AUTO

LIEN

HOME

PROP.

PROG.

$ 50.

yes

ON
HOME

$1,500.

Exempt

W

Stay

Alpine

AS NEEDED

Amador

73.50

Butte

160.00

no

no

Grant

Voucher

Intent

Loan

Cash

Intent

NO DEFINED LIMITS

no

no

600.

1,500.

$1,500.

no

500.

700.

2,000.

no

yes

Calaveras

40.00+

Grant

Cash

h.!

no

Util.
Colusa

Contra Costa

AS NEEDED (Pay rent and utilities and food) no

160.00

Loan

Voucher

Intent

NO DEFINED LIMITS

-0-

yes

4./

no

Exempt

1,500.
DelNorte

186.00

Loan

Voucher

Intent

yes

$ 50.

Eldorado

91.00

Loan

Voucher

Intent

u

-0-

500.

1,500.

Exempt

yes

2,000.

Exempt

yes

yes
I
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GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL

COUNTY

WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA

LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION
COUNTY

ONE

TYPE

PAID BY

PERSON

$248.00

Fresno

Glenn

Loan

Voucher

RESIDENCY

WORK

REQUIREMENT

PROG.

Intent

CASH

PERS.

AUTO

LIEN

HOME

PROP.

$1,000.

yes

ON

HOME

Exempt

yes

Exempt

yes

SINGLE PERSON INELIGIBLE

Humboldt

199.00

Loan

Cash &

Intent

$ 50.

50. 1,500.

Voucher

Imperial 1.1

248.00

Loan

Cash &

Intent

100.

300.

Exempt

Voucher

Inyo

8./

Kern

Kings

Lake

Lassen

5^/

AS NEEDED

Intent

201.00

Loan

Cash

Intent

yes

125.00

Loan

Voucher

Intent

yes

248.00

Loan

Voucher

Intent

yes

216.00

Loan

Cash

Intent

10./

-0

-0-

-0

-0

-0

-0-

-0

-0

1,000.

50.

■

-0

Exempt

yes

500.

Exempt

yes

600. 1,500.

Exempt

yes

500.

yes
bd
I
u>
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GENERAL RELIEF

COUNTY

ONE

TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA

TYPE

PAID BY

PERSON

Los Angeles

228.00

Loan

Cash &

RESIDENCY

WORK

REQUIREMENT

PROG.

Intent

yes

LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION
PERS.
AUTO
HOME

CASH

PROP.

50.

500.

11./

Loan

Cash

1,500.

186.00

11./

reg.

500.

750.

EDD

Loan

Cash

34,000.

yes

Mkt.Value

163.00

Marin

ON

HOME

Voucher
Madera

LIEN

Intent

reg.

20,000.

yes

Mkt.Value
600.

Exempt

600.

1,500.

14,000.

yes

EDD

Mariposa

Mendocino

151.75

248.00

Loan

Loan

Cash

Cash

12./
1-year

yes

Intent

13./

Assessed

yes

3,500.
500.

1,500.

Exempt

yes

14./

Exempt

yes

1,500.

Exempt

no

yes

Merced

198.00

Loan

Modoc

150.00

Grant

Cash

Intent

yes

Cash &

Intent

no

600.

15./
1-year

CETA

150.

Voucher

only

Cash &

Intent

16./

1,500.

Voucher
Mono

Monterey

140.00

248.00

Grant

Loan

Cash &

Voucher

500.

-0

16.

-0

Exempt

no

no

yes
w
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GENERAL RELIEF

TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA
LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION

COUNTY

ONE

TYPE

PAID BY

PERSON

Napa

248.00

Grant

Cash

RESIDENCY

WORK

REQUIREMENT

PROG.

Intent

17./

CASH

PERS.

AUTO

PROP.

50.

500.

225.00

Loan

Voucher

Intent

18./

ON

HOME

1,500.

yes

Nevada

LIEN

HOME

17./

no

5,000.
50.

500.

1,000.

1,000.

yes

Orange

240.00

Loan

Cash

Intent

yes

50.

Placer

192.00

Loan

Cash

Intent

yes

50.

18./
14,000.

yes

19./
5,000.

1,500.

Exempt

not
neces.

P lumas

217.00

Loan

Cash &

Intent

yes

500.

600.

-0

Exempt

yes

Voucher

Riverside

Sacramento

20.7

San Benito

191.00

Loan

Voucher

Intent

yes

250.

199.00

Loan

Cash

Intent

yes

10.

1,500.

173.00

Loan

Voucher

Intent

yes

50.

1,000.

-0

20,000.

yes

21./

yes

10,000.
San Bernardino

98.70

Grant

Voucher

Intent

no

10.

250.

22./
5,000.

no

w
I
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GENERAL RELIEF

COUNTY

ONE

TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL

TYPE

PAID BY

PERSON

San Diego

San Francisco

120.00

248.00

Loan

Grant

RESIDENCY

WORK

REQUIREMENT

PROG.

Cash

Intent

yes

Cash &

Intent

23./

Voucher

San Joaquin

San Luis 24•/

142.00

202.00

Grant

Grant

Obisbo
San Mateo

COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA
LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION
CASH
PERS.
AUTO
HOME
PROP.

50.

25•

LIEN
ON

HOME

500.

Exempt

yes

Exempt

Exempt

Exempt

no

600.

1,500.

Exempt

yes

Exempt

no

25.1

yes

yes

Voucher

Intent

yes

Cash &

Intent

no

Intent

yes

10.

AFDC STANDARDS

Voucher

248.00

Loan

Cash

50.

500.

2,500.
Santa Barbara

26./

Grant

295.00

Santa Clara

215.00

Cash 6t

Intent

yes

50.

Intent

yes

150.

27./

Cash

Grant
Santa Cruz

Shasta

248.00

201.00

800.

Exempt

no

11.l

Exempt

yes

Voucher

Loan

Loan

1,000.
Voucher

Intent

yes

Cash

Intent

yes

50.

200.

28./
1,500.

25,000.

yes

200.

1,500.

Exempt

yes
w
I
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GENERAL RELIEF

COUNTY

TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA
LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION

ONE

TYPE

PAID BY

PERSON

Sierra

Siskiyou

Solano

Sonoma

AS NEEDED

208.00

248.00

31./

Loan

Loan

Loan

Cash

Cash

Cash

Cash

RESIDENCY

WORK

REQUIREMENT

PROG.

Intent

CASH

PERS.

Sutter

240.00

150.00

Loan

Loan

Cash

Cash

HOME

PROP.

no

600.

600.

1,000.

100.

750.

1,000.

Intent

29./

Intent

yes

Intent

yes

-0

1,500.

Exempt

Intent

yes

300.

1,000.

20,000.

Intent

yes

300.

1,000.

25.

LIEN
ON

HOME

1,000.

227.50

Stanislaus

AUTO

Exempt

30.7
5,000.

32./

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

1,000
Tehama

33.7

Grant

110.00

Trinity

Tulare

AS NEEDED

215.00

Cash &

1-year 33./

no

600.

600.

200,

500.

34./

1,500.

Exempt

no

Voucher
Cash

Loan

Cash

i-year

Intent

no

34./

50.

2,000.

Exempt

no

yes

yes
w
I
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GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE

QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA

LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION
COUNTY

ONE

TYPE

PAID BY

PERSON

Tuolumrae

187.00

Loan

Cash &

RESIDENCY

WORK

REQUIREMENT

PROG.

l~year

yes

CASH

PERS.

AUTO

PROP.

;

250.

HOME

LIEN
ON

HOME

1,500.

Exempt

yes

35./

Exempt

yes

Voucher
Ventura '

Yolo

Yuba

201.00

Loan

Voucher

Intent

yes

174.00

Loan

Cash

Intent

yes

Cash &

Intent

37./

154.00

Loan

Voucher 

yes

100.

1,000.

300.

1,500.

36./
5,000.

50.

300.

37./
5,000.

no

yes

I
00
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COUNTY NOTES

*/ Alameda - Plan to use lien on real property in near future.

2./ Butte - Recipients work 20 hours per week before receipt of
grant.

3»/ Calaveras - Relative responsible for repajnnent of grant.
^*/ Contra Costa — Auto and personal property combined in totdl*
Work program requires two days work per week.

3*/ ElDorado - Recipient sent to county work program after two
months on general relief.

6>/ Humboldt - Work off grant before it is given.
7»/

Imperial - County has been subject of class-faction suit in
the recent past and has subsequently upgraded
their program. Currently, changes in AFDC will
cause changes in the general relief program.

8./

Inyo - Program is for residents only.

9./ Lake - This is a new program as of August 1982.
1Q»/

Lassen - Grant only given after it is worked off.

11 */

Madera - There is no limit oti the amount of utilities that
will be paid, there is no residency requirement.

12./

Mariposa - The county requires a one year residence in the
county before applicant is eligible for the general
relief program.

13./ Mendocino - Job search required of 6 places per week.
14*/

Merced - Personal property limit includes the auto limit.

15./ Mono - The county requires a one year residence in the county
before applicant is eligible for general relief.

16*/ Monterey - Grant is to be worked off before it is given.
Auto limit is included in the personal property
, ■ limit.

17*/ Napa - Job program is not run by the county, recipient may
have $3,000. equity in a home.
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18>/

Nevada - Grant is given after it is worked off, home value
is the assessed value of the home.

19./

Grange - Home limit is at assessed valuation.

20./

Sacramento - Even though these are the maximum limits for
general relief, the Bannon Street house run

by the Volunteers of America is the only
program of general relief currently in use for
the single adult or childless couples.

21./

San Benito - The county has a maximum grant of $175. for rent,
$62. for food, $6. for incidentals plus utilities
will be paid.

Applicant must work off rent costs
Home limit is at assessed

before they are paid.
valuation.

22./

San Bernardino - Home is at assessed value.

23./

San Francisco - Work program is in connection with Glide
Foundation. Some social workers are sta
tioned at the Glide Foundation.

24*/

San Luis Obisbo - I was told by Mr. Moore, of this county,
that the general relief program was a
"very complicated process."

25./

San Mateo - Home valuation based on market value less encum
brances.

26./

Santa Barbara - This county will give aid to those who are
verifiably living in their cars because
Santa Barbara has a very high occupancy
rate. Maximum grant consists of $195. for
rent, $7. for miscellaneous, $93. for gro
ceries, or $155. for restaurant food.

There

is a downtown hotel available for some reci

pients.

27./ Santa Clara - Work off before grant is given, car must be
5 years old or older.

28./

Santa Cruz - Auto limit is $500. above encumbrances.

29./

Siskiyou - Must register with FDD and do job search.

30./

Soloano - Home limit is at net value.

31./

Sonoma - Emergency aid can be given for up to three days.
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•! Sutter - Home limit is the equity in a home a recipient
may have.

21^/ Tehama - Grant given plus utilities. Eligibility limited
to those who have one year residency in county
and 3 years in the state.

2^/ Tulare - County work program pays $2.68 per hour. Per
sonal property limit is based on need.

22^/ Ventura — Auto limit is included in the personal pro
perty limit.

22i./

Yolo - Home limit is at net market value.

27_^/ Yuba - In order to conduct a job search, a recipient must
contact 6 employers per week at the rate of 1 con

tact per day. Home limit is shown as $5,000 equity.

